ISO 26262 Part 1: Vocabulary 安全(62)

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ISO 26262-1:2018 Road vehicles ? Functional safety ? Part 1: Vocabulary
https://www.iso.org/standard/68383.html

Foreword
Introduction
1 Scope
2 Normative references
3 Terms and definitions
4 Abbreviated terms
Bibliography

3.1 architecture
representation of the structure of the item (3.84) or element (3.41) that allows identification of building blocks, their boundaries and interfaces, and includes the allocation of requirements to these building blocks
3.2 ASIL capability
capability of the item (3.84) or element (3.41) to meet assumed safety (3.132) requirements assigned with a given ASIL (3.6)
Note 1 to entry: As a part of hardware safety requirements, achievement of the corresponding random hardware target values for fault metrics (see ISO 26262-5:2018, Clauses 8 and 9) allocated to the element (3.41) is included, if needed.
3.3 ASIL decomposition
apportioning of redundant safety (3.132) requirements to elements (3.41), with sufficient independence (3.78), conducing to the same safety goal (3.139), with the objective of reducing the ASIL (3.6) of the redundant safety (3.132) requirements that are allocated to the corresponding elements (3.41)
Note 1 to entry: ASIL decomposition is a basis for methods of ASIL (3.6) tailoring during the design process (defined as requirements decomposition with respect to ASIL (3.6) tailoring in ISO 26262-9).
Note 2 to entry: ASIL decomposition does not apply to random hardware failure requirements per ISO 26262-9.
Note 3 to entry: Reducing the ASIL (3.6) of the redundant safety (3.132) requirements has some exclusions, e.g. confirmation measures (3.23) remain at the level of the safety goal (3.139).
3.4 assessment
examination of whether a characteristic of an item (3.84) or element (3.41) achieves the ISO 26262 objectives
3.5 audit
examination of an implemented process with regard to the process objectives
3.6 automotive safety integrity level
ASIL
one of four levels to specify the item's (3.84) or element's (3.41) necessary ISO 26262 requirements and safety measures (3.141) to apply for avoiding an unreasonable risk (3.176), with D representing the most stringent and A the least stringent level
Note 1 to entry: QM (3.117) is not an ASIL.
3.7 availability
capability of a product to provide a stated function if demanded, under given conditions over its defined lifetime
3.8 base failure rate, BFR
failure rate (3.53) of a hardware element (3.41) in a given application use case used as an input to safety (3.132) analyses
3.9 base vehicle
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) T&B vehicle configuration (3.175) prior to installation of body builder equipment (3.12)
Note 1 to entry: Body builder equipment (3.12) may be installed on a base vehicle that consists of all driving relevant systems (3.163) (engine, driveline, chassis, steering, brakes, cabin and driver information).
EXAMPLE:Truck (3.174) chassis with powertrain and cabin, rolling chassis with powertrain.
3.10 baseline
version of the approved set of one or more work products (3.185), items (3.84) or elements (3.41) that serves as a basis for change
Note 1 to entry: See ISO 26262-8:2018, Clause 8.
Note 2 to entry: A baseline is typically placed under configuration management.
Note 3 to entry: A baseline is used as a basis for further development through the change management process during the lifecycle (3.86).
3.11 body builder, BB
organization that adds trucks (3.174), buses (3.14), trailers (3.171) and semi-trailers (3.151) (T&B) bodies, cargo carriers, or equipment to a base vehicle (3.9)
Note 1 to entry: T&B bodies include truck (3.174) cabs, bus (3.14) bodies, walk-in vans, etc.
Note 2 to entry: Cargo carriers include cargo boxes, flat beds, car transport racks, etc.
Note 3 to entry: Equipment includes vocational devices and machinery, such as cement mixers, dump beds, snow blades, lifts, etc.
3.12 body builder equipment
machine, body, or cargo carrier installed on the T&B base vehicle (3.9)
3.13 branch coverage
percentage of branches of the control flow of a computer program executed during a test
Note 1 to entry: 100 % branch coverage implies 100 % statementcoverage (3.160).
Note 2 to entry: An if-statement always has two branches - condition true and condition false - independent of the existence of an else-clause.
3.14 bus
motor vehicle which, because of its design and appointments, is intended for carrying persons and luggage, and which has more than nine seating places, including the driving seat
Note 1 to entry: A bus may have one or two decks and may also tow a trailer (3.171).
3.15 calibration data
data that will be applied as software parameter values after the software build in the development process
EXAMPLE:Parameters (e.g. value for low idle speed, engine characteristic diagrams); vehicle specific parameters (adaptation values, e.g., limit stop for throttle valve); variant coding (e.g. country code, left-hand/right-hand steering).
Note 1 to entry: Calibration data does not contain executable or interpretable code.
3.16 candidate
item (3.84) or element (3.41) whose definition and conditions of use are identical to, or have a very high degree of commonality with, an item (3.84) or element (3.41) that is already released and in operation
Note 1 to entry: This definition applies where candidate is used in the context of a proven in use argument (3.115).
3.17 cascading failure
failure (3.50) of an element (3.41) of an item (3.84) resulting from a root cause [inside or outside of the element (3.41)] and then causing a failure (3.50) of another element (3.41) or elements (3.41) of the same or different item (3.84)
Note 1 to entry: Cascading failures are dependent failures (3.29) that could be one of the possible root causes of a common cause failure (3.18). See Figure 2.
Figure 2 ? Cascading failure
3.18 common cause failure, CCF
failure (3.50) of two or more elements (3.41) of an item (3.84) resulting directly from a single specific event or root cause which is either internal or external to all of these elements (3.41)
Note 1 to entry: Common cause failures are dependent failures (3.29) that are not cascading failures (3.17). See Figure 3.
Figure 3 ? Common cause failure
3.19 common mode failure, CMF
case of CCF (3.18) in which multiple elements (3.41) fail in the same manner
Note 1 to entry: Failure (3.50) in the same manner does not necessarily mean that they need to fail exactly the same. How close the failure modes (3.51) need to be in order to be classified as common mode failure depends on the context.
EXAMPLE 1:A system (3.163) has two temperature sensors which are compared with each other. If the difference between the two temperature sensors is larger than or equal to 5 °C it is handled as a fault (3.54) and the system (3.163) is switched into a safe state (3.131). A common mode failure lets both temperature sensors fail in such a way that the difference between the two sensors is smaller than 5 °C and therefore is not detected.
EXAMPLE 2:In a CPU lockstep architecture (3.1) where the outputs of both CPUs are compared cycle by cycle, both CPUs need to fail exactly the same way in order for the failure (3.50) to go undetected. In this context, a common mode failure lets both CPUs fail exactly the same way.
EXAMPLE 3:An over voltage failure (3.50) due to lots of parts not meeting their specification for over voltage is a common mode failure.
3.20 complete vehicle
fully assembled T&B base vehicle (3.9) with its body builder equipment (3.12)
EXAMPLE:Refuse collector, dump truck (3.174).
3.21 component
non-system level element (3.41) that is logically or technically separable and is comprised of more than one hardware part (3.71) or one or more software units (3.159)
EXAMPLE:A microcontroller.
Note 1 to entry: A component is a part of a system (3.163).
3.22 configuration data
data that is assigned during element build and that controls the element build process
EXAMPLE 1:Pre-processor variable settings which are used to derive compile time variants from the source code.
EXAMPLE 2:XML files to control the build tools or toolchain.
Note 1 to entry: Configuration data controls the software build. Configuration data is used to select code from existing code variants already defined in the code base. The functionality of selected code variant will be included in the executable code.
Note 2 to entry: Since configuration data is only used to select code variants, configuration data does not include code that is executed or interpreted during the use of the item (3.84).
3.23 confirmation measure
confirmation review (3.24), audit (3.5) or assessment (3.4) concerning functional safety (3.67)
3.24 confirmation review
confirmation that a work product (3.185) provides sufficient and convincing evidence of their contribution to the achievement of functional safety (3.67) considering the corresponding objectives and requirements of ISO 26262
Note 1 to entry: A complete list of confirmation reviews is given in ISO 26262-2.
Note 2 to entry: The goal of confirmation reviews is to ensure compliance with the ISO 26262 series of standards.
3.25 controllability
ability to avoid a specified harm (3.74) or damage through the timely reactions of the persons involved, possibly with support from external measures (3.49)
Note 1 to entry: Persons involved can include the driver, passengers or persons in the vicinity of the vehicle's exterior.
Note 2 to entry: The parameter C in hazard analysis and risk assessment (3.76) represents the potential for controllability.
3.26 coupling factors
common characteristic or relationship of elements (3.41) that leads to a dependence in their failures (3.50)
3.27 dedicated measure
measure to ensure the failure rate (3.53) claimed in the evaluation of the probability of violation of safety goals (3.139)
EXAMPLE:Design feature such as hardware part (3.71) over-design (e.g. electrical or thermal stress rating) or physical separation (e.g. spacing of contacts on a printed circuit board); special sample test of incoming material to reduce the risk (3.128) of occurrence of failure modes (3.51) which contribute to the violation of safety goals (3.139); burn-in test; dedicated control plan.
3.28 degradation
state or transition to a state of the item (3.84) or element (3.41) with reduced functionality, performance, or both
3.29 dependent failures
failures (3.50) that are not statistically independent, i.e. the probability of the combined occurrence of the failures (3.50) is not equal to the product of the probabilities of occurrence of all considered independent failures (3.50)
Note 1 to entry: Dependent failures can manifest themselves simultaneously, or within a sufficiently short time interval, to have the effect of simultaneous failures (3.50).
Note 2 to entry: Dependent failures include common cause failures (3.18) and cascading failures (3.17).
Note 3 to entry: Whether a given failure (3.50) is a cascading failure (3.17) or a common cause failure (3.18) may depend on the hierarchical structure of the elements (3.41).
Note 4 to entry: Whether a given failure (3.50) is a cascading failure (3.17) or a common cause failure (3.18) may depend on the temporal behaviour of the elements (3.41).
Note 5 to entry: Dependent failures can include software failures (3.50) even if the probability of the failure (3.50) is not calculated.
3.30 dependent failure initiator, DFI
single root cause that leads multiple elements (3.41) to fail through coupling factors (3.26)
Note 1 to entry: Coupling factors (3.26) which are candidates for dependencies are identified during DFA.
Note 2 to entry: Failure (3.50) of elements (3.41) can happen simultaneously or sequentially.
EXAMPLE 1:Coupling factor (3.26): Two SW units using the same RAM. Root cause: One SW unit unintentionally corrupts data used by the second SW unit.
EXAMPLE 2:Coupling factor (3.26): Two ECUs operating in the same compartment of the car. Root cause: Unwanted/unexpected water intrusion into that particular compartment leads to flooding and to failure (3.50) of both ECUs.
EXAMPLE 3:Coupling factor (3.26): Two microcontrollers using the same 3,3 V power supply. Root cause: Overvoltage on the 3,3 V, damaging both microcontrollers.
3.31 detected fault
fault (3.54) whose presence is detected within a prescribed time by a safety mechanism (3.142)
Note 1 to entry: The prescribed time can be the fault detection time interval (3.55) or the multiple-point fault detection time interval (3.98).
3.32 development interface agreement, DIA
agreement between customer and supplier in which the responsibilities for activities to be performed, evidence to be reviewed, or work products (3.185) to be exchanged by each party related to the development of items (3.84) or elements (3.41) are specified
Note 1 to entry: While DIA applies to the development phase, supply agreement (3.162) applies to production.
3.33 diagnostic coverage, DC
percentage of the failure rate (3.53) of a hardware element (3.41), or percentage of the failure rate (3.53) of a failure mode (3.51) of a hardware element (3.41) that is detected or controlled by the implemented safety mechanism (3.142)
Note 1 to entry: Diagnostic coverage can be assessed with regard to residual faults (3.125) or with regard to latent multiple-point faults (3.97) that might occur in a hardware element (3.41).
Note 2 to entry: Safety mechanisms (3.142) implemented at different levels in the architecture (3.1) can be considered.
Note 3 to entry: Except when it is explicitly mentioned, the proportion of safe faults (3.130) of a safety-related hardware element (3.41) is not considered when determining the diagnostic coverage of the safety mechanism (3.142).
3.34 diagnostic points
output signals of an element (3.41) at which the detection or correction of a fault (3.54) is observed
Note 1 to entry: Diagnostic points are also referred to as "alarms" or "error (3.46) flags" or "correction flags".
EXAMPLE:Read back information.
3.35 diagnostic test time interval
amount of time between the executions of online diagnostic tests by a safety mechanism (3.142) including duration of the execution of an online diagnostic test
Note 1 to entry: See Figure 5.
3.36 distributed development
development of an item (3.84) or element (3.41) with development responsibility divided between the customer and supplier(s) for the entire item (3.84) or element (3.41)
Note 1 to entry: Customer and supplier are roles of the cooperating parties.
3.37 diversity
different solutions satisfying the same requirement, with the goal of achieving independence (3.78)
Note 1 to entry: Diversity does not guarantee independence (3.78), but can deal with certain types of common cause failures (3.18).
Note 2 to entry: Diversity can be a technical solution [diverse hardware components (3.21), diverse SW components (3.21)] or a technical means (e.g. diverse compiler) to apply.
Note 3 to entry: Diversity is one way to realize redundancy (3.122).
EXAMPLE:Diverse programming; diverse hardware.
3.38 dual-point failure
failure (3.50) resulting from the combination of two independent hardware faults (3.54) that leads directly to the violation of a safety goal (3.139)
Note 1 to entry: Dual-point failures are multiple-point failures (3.96) of order 2.
Note 2 to entry: Dual-point failures that are addressed in the ISO 26262 series of standards include those where one fault (3.54) affects a safety-related element (3.144) and another fault (3.54) affects the corresponding safety mechanism (3.142) intended to achieve or maintain a safe state (3.131).
3.39 dual-point fault
individual fault (3.54) that, in combination with another independent fault (3.54), leads to a dual-point failure (3.38)
Note 1 to entry: A dual-point fault can only be recognized after the identification of a dual-point failure (3.38), e.g. from cut set analysis of a fault tree.
Note 2 to entry: See also multiple-point fault (3.97).
3.40 electrical and/or electronic system, E/E system
system (3.163) that consists of electrical or electronic elements (3.41), including programmable electronic elements (3.41)
Note 1 to entry: An element (3.41) of an E/E system can also be another E/E system.
EXAMPLE:Power supply; sensor or other input device; communication path; actuator or other output device.
3.41 element
system (3.163), components (3.21) (hardware or software), hardware parts (3.71), or software units (3.159)
Note 1 to entry: When “software element” or “hardware element” is used, this phrase denotes an element of software only or an element of hardware only, respectively.
Note 2 to entry: An element may also be a SEooC (3.138).
3.42 embedded software
fully-integrated software to be executed on a processing element (3.113)
3.43 emergency operation
operating mode (3.102) of an item (3.84), for providing safety (3.132) after the reaction to a fault (3.54) until the transition to a safe state (3.131) is achieved
Note 1 to entry: See Figure 4 and Figure 5.
Note 2 to entry: When a safe state (3.131) cannot be directly reached, or cannot be timely reached, or cannot be maintained after the detection of a fault (3.54), a safety mechanism (3.142) can transition the item (3.84) to emergency operation for providing safety (3.132) until the transition to a safe state (3.131) is achieved and maintained.
Note 3 to entry: Emergency operation and associated emergency operation tolerance time interval (3.45) are described in the warning and degradation strategy (3.183).
Note 4 to entry: Degradation (3.28) can be part of the concept for emergency operation.
EXAMPLE:Emergency operation can be specified as part of the error (3.46) reaction of a fault tolerant item (3.84).
3.44 emergency operation time interval, EOTI
time-span during which emergency operation (3.43) is maintained
Note 1 to entry: See Figure 4 and Figure 5.
Note 2 to entry: Emergency operation (3.43) and associated emergency operation tolerance time interval (3.45) are described in the warning and degradation strategy (3.183).
Note 3 to entry: Emergency operation (3.43) is temporarily maintained for providing safety (3.132) until the transition to a safe state (3.131) is achieved.
3.45 emergency operation tolerance time interval, EOTTI
specified time-span during which emergency operation (3.43) can be maintained without an unreasonable level of risk (3.128)
Note 1 to entry: See Figure 4.
Note 2 to entry: Emergency operation tolerance time interval is the maximum value of the emergency operation time interval (3.44).
Note 3 to entry: Emergency operation (3.43) can be considered safe due to the limited operation time as defined in the emergency operation tolerance time interval.
Figure 4 ? Emergency operation tolerance time interval
3.46 error
discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition, and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition
Note 1 to entry: An error can arise as a result of a fault (3.54) within the system (3.163) or component (3.21) being considered.
3.47 expert rider
role filled by persons capable of evaluating controllability (3.25) classifications based on operation of actual motorcycles (3.93)
Note 1 to entry: An expert rider is a rider who has the:
? skill to evaluate controllability (3.25) including knowledge to evaluate;
? capability to conduct the vehicle test; and
? knowledge to evaluate motorcycle (3.93)controllability (3.25) characteristics with respect to a representative rider's riding capability.
Note 2 to entry: See ISO 26262-12:2018, Annex C for information relating to the use of expert riders.
3.48 exposure
state of being in an operational situation (3.104) that can be hazardous if coincident with the failure mode (3.51) under analysis
Note 1 to entry: The parameter “E” in hazard analysis and risk assessment (3.76) represents the potential exposure to the operational situation (3.104).
3.49 external measure
measure that is separate and distinct from the item (3.84) which reduces or mitigates the risks (3.128) resulting from the item (3.84)
3.50 failure
termination of an intended behaviour of an element (3.41) or an item (3.84) due to a fault (3.54) manifestation
Note 1 to entry: Termination can be permanent or transient.
3.51 failure mode
manner in which an element (3.41) or an item (3.84) fails to provide the intended behaviour
3.52 failure mode coverage, FMC
proportion of the failure rate (3.53) of a failure mode (3.51) of a hardware element (3.41) that is detected or controlled by the implemented safety mechanism (3.142)
3.53 failure rate
probability density of failure (3.50) divided by probability of survival for a hardware element (3.41)
Note 1 to entry: The failure rate is assumed to be constant and is generally denoted as “λ”.
3.54 fault
abnormal condition that can cause an element (3.41) or an item (3.84) to fail
Note 1 to entry: Permanent, intermittent, and transient faults (3.173) (especially soft errors) are considered.
Note 2 to entry: When a subsystem is in an error (3.46) state it could result in a fault for the system (3.163).
Note 3 to entry: An intermittent fault occurs from time to time and then disappears again. This type of fault can occur when a component (3.21) is on the verge of breaking down or, for example, due to an internal malfunction in a switch. Some systematic faults (3.165) (e.g. timing irregularities) could lead to intermittent faults.
3.55 fault detection time interval, FDTI
time-span from the occurrence of a fault (3.54) to its detection
Note 1 to entry: See Figure 5.
Note 2 to entry: Fault detection time interval is determined independently of diagnostic test time interval (3.35).
EXAMPLE:The fault detection time interval of a diagnostic test can be longer than the diagnostic test time interval (3.35) due to implemented error (3.46) counters, i.e. the fault (3.54) must be detected more than once by the diagnostic test before triggering an error (3.46) reaction.
Note 3 to entry: Fault detection time interval, diagnostic test time interval (3.35), and fault reaction time interval (3.59) are relevant characteristics of a safety mechanism (3.142) based on fault (3.54) detection.
Note 4 to entry: A fault (3.54) is timely covered by the corresponding safety mechanism (3.142) if the fault detection time interval plus the fault reaction time interval (3.59) is lower than the relevant fault tolerant time interval (3.61).
3.56 fault handling time interval, FHTI
sum of fault detection time interval (3.55) and the fault reaction time interval (3.59)
Note 1 to entry: The FHTI is a property of a safety mechanism (3.142).
Note 2 to entry: See Figure 5.
3.57 fault injection
method to evaluate the effect of a fault (3.54) within an element (3.41) by inserting faults (3.54), errors (3.46), or failures (3.50) in order to observe the reaction by observation points (3.101)
Note 1 to entry: Fault injection can be performed at various levels of abstraction including item (3.84) or element (3.41) level depending on the scope, feasibility, observability and level of required detail. Depending on purpose, it can be performed at different stages of the safety lifecycle and by considering different faultmodels (3.58).
EXAMPLE 1:Injecting faults (3.54) during operation to verify that a safety mechanism (3.142) is working properly as part of a strategy to detect latent faults (3.85).
EXAMPLE 2:Injecting faults (3.54) during integration test through hardware debug ports or through dedicated software commands to test the hardware-software interface (HSI).
EXAMPLE 3:Simulating stuck-at faults (3.54) or transient faults at hardware component level to verify the diagnostic coverage (3.33) of a safety mechanism (3.142) or to identify faults (3.54) which may result in errors (3.46) or failures (3.50).
3.58 fault model
representation of failuremodes (3.51) resulting from faults (3.54)
Note 1 to entry: Fault models are used to assess consequences of particular faults (3.54).
3.59 fault reaction time interval, FRTI
time-span from the detection of a fault (3.54) to reaching a safe state (3.131) or to reaching emergency operation (3.43)
Note 1 to entry: See Figure 4 and Figure 5.
3.60 fault tolerance
ability to deliver a specified functionality in the presence of one or more specified faults (3.54)
Note 1 to entry: Specified functionality can be intended functionality (3.83).
3.61 fault tolerant time intervalk, FTTI
minimum time-span from the occurrence of a fault (3.54) in an item (3.84) to a possible occurrence of a hazardous event (3.77), if the safety mechanisms (3.142) are not activated
Note 1 to entry: See Figure 5.
Note 2 to entry: The minimum time-span is to be evaluated over all hazardous events (3.77). It can depend on the characterization of the hazards (3.75).
Note 3 to entry: FTTI is related to a hazard (3.75) caused by a malfunctioning behaviour (3.88) of the item (3.84). FTTI is a relevant attribute for safety goals (3.139) derived from this hazard (3.75).
Note 4 to entry: A fault (3.54) is timely covered by a safety mechanism (3.142), if the item (3.84) is maintained in a safe state (3.131), or if the item (3.84) is transitioned to a safe state (3.131), or is transitioned to an emergency operation (3.43), within the relevant fault tolerant time interval.
Note 5 to entry: The occurrence of a hazardous event (3.77) is dependent on a fault (3.54) being present and a vehicle being in a scenario that allows the fault (3.54) to affect vehicle behaviour.
EXAMPLE:A failure (3.50) in the brake system (3.163) may not result in a hazardous event (3.77) until the brakes are applied.
Note 6 to entry: While the FTTI is defined only at the item (3.84) level, at the element (3.41) level the maximum fault handling time interval (3.56) and the state to be achieved after fault handling to support the functional safety concept (3.68) can be specified.
Note 7 to entry: The fault detection time interval (3.55) may include multiple diagnostic test time intervals (3.35) to allow de-bouncing of errors (3.46) if the diagnostic test time interval (3.35) is sufficiently shorter than the fault detection time interval (3.55).
Figure 5 ? Safety relevant time intervals
3.62 field data
data obtained from the use of an item (3.84) or element (3.41) including cumulative operating hours, all failures (3.50) and in-service safety anomalies (3.134)
Note 1 to entry: Field data normally comes from customer use.
3.63 formal notation
description technique that has both its syntax and semantics completely defined
EXAMPLE:Z notation (Zed); NuSMV (symbolic model checker); Prototype Verification System (PVS); Vienna Development Method (VDM); mathematical formulae.
3.64 formal verification
method used to prove the correctness of an item (3.84) or element (3.41) against the specification of its function or properties in formal notation (3.63)
3.65 freedom from interference
absence of cascading failures (3.17) between two or more elements (3.41) that could lead to the violation of a safety (3.132) requirement
EXAMPLE 1:Element (3.41) 1 is free of interference from element (3.41) 2 if no failure (3.50) of element (3.41) 2 can cause element (3.41) 1 to fail.
EXAMPLE 2:Element (3.41) 3 interferes with element (3.41) 4 if there exists a failure (3.50) of element (3.41) 3 that causes element (3.41) 4 to fail.
3.66 functional concept
specification of the intended functions and their interactions necessary to achieve the desired behaviour
Note 1 to entry: The functional concept is developed during the concept phase (3.110).
3.67 functional safety
absence of unreasonable risk (3.176) due to hazards (3.75) caused by malfunctioning behaviour (3.88) of E/E systems (3.40)
3.68 functional safety concept
specification of the functional safety requirements (3.69), with associated information, their allocation to elements (3.41) within the architecture (3.1), and their interaction necessary to achieve the safety goals (3.139)
3.69 functional safety requirement
specification of implementation-independent safety (3.132) behaviour or implementation-independent safety measure (3.141) including its safety-related attributes
Note 1 to entry: A functional safety requirement can be a safety (3.132) requirement implemented by a safety-related E/E system (3.40), or by a safety-related system (3.163) of other technologies (3.105), in order to achieve or maintain a safe state (3.131) for the item (3.84) taking into account a determined hazardous event (3.77).
Note 2 to entry: The functional safety requirements might be specified independently of the technology used in the concept phase (3.110) of product development.
Note 3 to entry: Safety-related attributes include information about the ASIL (3.6).
3.70 hardware architectural metrics
metrics for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the hardware architecture (3.1) with respect to safety (3.132)
Note 1 to entry: The single-point fault (3.156) metric and the latent fault (3.85) metric are the hardware architectural metrics.
3.71 hardware part
portion of a hardware component (3.21) at the first level of hierarchical decomposition
EXAMPLE:The CPU of a microcontroller, a resistor, flash array of a microcontroller.
3.72 hardware elementary subpart
smallest portion of a hardware subpart (3.73) considered in safety (3.132) analysis
EXAMPLE:A flip-flop of the ALU with its logic cone, a register.
3.73 hardware subpart
portion of a hardware part (3.71) that can be logically divided and represents second or greater level of hierarchical decomposition
EXAMPLE:ALU of a CPU of a microcontroller, register bank of a CPU.
3.74 harm
physical injury or damage to the health of persons
3.75 hazard
potential source of harm (3.74) caused by malfunctioning behaviour (3.88) of the item (3.84)
Note 1 to entry: This definition is restricted to the scope of the ISO 26262 series of standards; a more general definition is potential source of harm (3.74).
3.76 hazard analysis and risk assessment, HARA
method to identify and categorize hazardous events (3.77) of items (3.84) and to specify safety goals (3.139) and ASILs (3.6) related to the prevention or mitigation of the associated hazards (3.75) in order to avoid unreasonable risk (3.176)
3.77 hazardous event
combination of a hazard (3.75) and an operational situation (3.104)
3.78 independence
absence of dependent failures (3.29) between two or more elements (3.41) that could lead to the violation of a safety (3.132) requirement, or organizational separation of the parties performing an action
Note 1 to entry: ASIL decomposition (3.3) or confirmation measures (3.23) include requirements on independence.
3.79 independent failures
failures (3.50) whose probability of simultaneous or successive occurrence can be expressed as the simple product of their unconditional probabilities
Note 1 to entry: Independent failures can include software failures (3.50) even if their probability of failure is not calculated.
3.80 informal notation
description technique that does not have its syntax completely defined
Note 1 to entry: An incomplete syntax definition implies that the semantics are also not completely defined.
3.81 inheritance
conveyance of attributes of requirements in an unchanged manner to the next level of detail during the development process
3.82 inspection
examination of work products (3.185), following a formal procedure, in order to detect safety anomalies (3.134)
Note 1 to entry: Inspection is a means of verification (3.180).
Note 2 to entry: Inspection differs from testing (3.169) in that it does not normally involve the operation of the associated item (3.84) or element (3.41).
Note 3 to entry: A formal procedure normally includes a previously defined procedure, checklist, moderator and review (3.127) of the results.
3.83 intended functionality
behaviour specified for an item (3.84), excluding safety mechanisms (3.142)
Note 1 to entry: The specified behaviour is at the vehicle level.
3.84 item
system (3.163) or combination of systems (3.163), to which ISO 26262 is applied, that implements a function or part of a function at the vehicle level
Note 1 to entry: See vehicle function (3.178).
3.85 latent fault
multiple-point fault (3.97) whose presence is not detected by a safety mechanism (3.142) nor perceived by the driver within the multiple-point fault detection time interval (3.98)
3.86 lifecycle
entirety of phases (3.110) from concept through decommissioning of the item (3.84)
3.87 management system
policies, procedures and processes an organization uses to meet its objectives
3.88 malfunctioning behaviour
failure (3.50) or unintended behaviour of an item (3.84) with respect to its design intent
3.89 maximum time to repair time interval
specified time-span during which a safe state (3.131) can be maintained
Note 1 to entry: Maximum time to repair is a relevant characteristic when a safe state (3.131) cannot be maintained until the end of the remaining vehicle service life.
Note 2 to entry: The conditions for recovering from the safe state (3.131) are described in the warning and degradation strategy (3.183).
Note 3 to entry: If relevant, maximum time to repair time interval is described in the warning and degradation strategy (3.183).
3.90 model-based development, MBD
development that uses models to describe the behaviour or properties of an element (3.41) to be developed
Note 1 to entry: Depending on the level of abstraction used for such a model, the model can be used for simulation or code generation or both.
3.91 modification
Creation of a new item (3.84) from an existing item (3.84)
Note 1 to entry: Modification is used in the ISO 26262 series of standards with respect to re-use for lifecycle (3.86) tailoring. A change is applied during the lifecycle (3.86) of an item (3.84), while a modification is applied to create a new item (3.84) from an existing one.
3.92 modified condition/decision coverage, MC/DC
percentage of all single condition outcomes that independently affect a decision outcome that have been exercised in the control flow
Note 1 to entry: MC/DC is a type of code coverage analysis. It builds on top of branch coverage (3.13), and as such, it too requires that all code blocks and all execution paths have been tested.
3.93 motorcycle
two-wheeled motor-driven vehicle, or three-wheeled motor-driven vehicle whose unladen weight does not exceed 800 kg, excluding mopeds as defined in ISO 3833
3.94 motorcycle safety integrity level, MSIL
one of four levels that specify the item’s (3.84) or element's (3.41) necessary ISO 26262risk (3.128) reduction requirements and convert to ASIL (3.6) for safety measures (3.141) to apply for avoiding unreasonable residual risk (3.126) for items (3.84) and elements (3.41) used specifically in motorcycle (3.93) applications, with D representing the most stringent and A the least stringent level
3.95 multi-core
hardware component (3.21) which includes two or more hardware processing elements (3.113) which can operate independently from each other
3.96 multiple-point failure
failure (3.50), resulting from the combination of several independent hardware faults (3.54), which leads directly to the violation of a safety goal (3.139)
3.97 multiple-point fault
individual fault (3.54) that, in combination with other independent faults (3.54), if undetected and not perceived, could lead to a multiple-point failure (3.96)
Note 1 to entry: A multiple-point fault can only be recognized after the identification of a multiple-point failure (3.96), e.g. from cut set analysis of a fault tree.
3.98 multiple-point fault detection time interval
time-span to detect a multiple-point fault (3.97) before it can contribute to a multiple-point failure (3.96)
3.99 new development
process of creating an item (3.84) or element (3.41) having a previously unspecified functionality, or a novel implementation of an existing functionality, or both
3.100 non-functional hazard
hazard (3.75) that arises due to factors other than malfunctioning behaviour (3.88) of the E/E system (3.40), safety-related systems (3.163) of other technologies (3.105), or external measures (3.49)
3.101 observation points
output signals of an element (3.41) at which the potential effect of a fault (3.54) is observed
EXAMPLE:Output of a memory.
3.102 operating mode
conditions of functional state that arise from the use and application of an item (3.84) or element (3.41)
EXAMPLE:System (3.163) off; system (3.163) active; system (3.163) passive; degraded operation; emergency operation (3.43); safe state (3.131).
3.103 operating time
cumulative time that an item (3.84) or element (3.41) is functioning, including degraded modes
3.104 operational situation
scenario that can occur during a vehicle's life
EXAMPLE:Driving at high speed; parking on a slope; maintenance.
3.105 other technology
technology different from E/E technologies that are within the scope of ISO 26262
EXAMPLE:Mechanical technology; hydraulic technology.
Note 1 to entry: Other technologies can either be considered in the specification of the functional safety concept (3.68) (see ISO 26262-3:2018, Clause 7 and Figure 2), during the allocation of safety (3.132) requirements (see ISO 26262-3 and ISO 26262-4), or as an external measure (3.49).
3.106 partitioning
separation of functions or elements (3.41) to achieve a design
Note 1 to entry: Partitioning can be used for fault (3.54) containment to avoid cascading failures (3.17). To achieve freedom from interference (3.65) between partitioned design elements (3.41), additional non-functional requirements can be introduced.
3.107 passenger car
vehicle designed and constructed primarily for the carriage of persons and their luggage, their goods, or both, having not more than a seating capacity of eight, in addition to the driver, and without space for standing passengers
3.108 perceived fault
fault (3.54) that may be perceived indirectly (through deviating behaviour on vehicle level)
3.109 permanent fault
fault (3.54) that occurs and stays until removed or repaired
Note 1 to entry: Direct current (d.c.) faults (3.54), e.g. stuck-at, and bridging faults (3.54) are permanent faults.
3.110 phase
stage in the safety (3.132)lifecycle (3.86) that is specified in ISO 26262-3, ISO 26262-4, ISO 26262-5, ISO 26262-6, and ISO 26262-7
Note 1 to entry: The distinct parts ISO 26262-3, ISO 26262-4, ISO 26262-5, ISO 26262-6 and ISO 26262-7 specify, respectively, the phases of:
? concept,
? product development at the system (3.163) level,
? product development at the hardware level,
? product development at the software level, and
? production, operation, service and decommissioning.
3.111 physics of failure, PoF
science-based approach to reliability based on failure (3.50) mechanism research
Note 1 to entry: PoF is typically applied using durability simulations performed in a Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) environment.
Note 2 to entry: PoF analysis may have an advantage when assessing reliability of new technologies and designs since years of field failure (3.50) history are not needed to make the reliability prediction.
3.112 power take-off, PTO
interface which enables a truck (3.174) or tractor (3.170) power source to operate equipment
EXAMPLE:Interface to operate hydraulic pump, vacuum, lift, dump bed, cement mixer.
3.113 processing element, PE
hardware part (3.71) providing a set of functions for data processing, normally consisting of a register set, an execution unit, and a control unit
EXAMPLE 1:A hardware component (3.21) consisting of four cores can be described as having four PEs.
EXAMPLE 2:The streaming multi-processors in a GPU can be considered PEs.
3.114 programmable logic device, PLD
hardware component (3.21) or hardware part (3.71) which has an undefined circuit function at the time of manufacture and is configured during integration into a higher level element (3.41)
3.115 proven in use argument
evidence that, based on analysis of field data (3.62) resulting from use of a candidate (3.16), the probability of any failure (3.50) of this candidate that could impair a safety goal (3.139) of an item (3.84), meets the requirements for the applicable ASIL (3.6)
3.116 proven in use credit
substitution of a given set of lifecycle (3.86)sub-phases (3.161) with corresponding work products (3.185) by a proven in use argument (3.115)
3.117 quality management, QM
coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to quality
Note 1 to entry: QM is not an ASIL (3.6), but may be specified in the hazard analysis and risk assessment (3.76).
3.118 random hardware failure
failure (3.50) that can occur unpredictably during the lifetime of a hardware element (3.41) and that follows a probability distribution
Note 1 to entry: Random hardware failure rates can be predicted with reasonable accuracy.
Note 2 to entry: Physical hardware failures (3.50) as defined by the PoF (3.111) methodology (SAE J1211, JEDEC JEP122, or similar) can be considered as random hardware failures for the purpose of this document.
3.119 random hardware fault
hardware fault (3.54) with a probabilistic distribution
3.120 reasonably foreseeable
technically possible and with a credible or measurable rate of occurrence
Note 1 to entry: Expected misuse can be understood as a sub-class of reasonably foreseeable event.
3.121 rebuilding
altering a T&B from its original configuration in order to perform a different task
Note 1 to entry: Rebuilding can include modification (3.91) of T&B vehicle configuration (3.175).
3.122 redundancy
existence of means in addition to the means that would be sufficient to perform a required function or to represent information
Note 1 to entry: Redundancy is used in ISO 26262 series of standards with respect to achieving a safety goal (3.139) or a specified safety (3.132) requirement, or to representing safety-related information.
Note 2 to entry: The redundancy could be implemented homogenously or with diversity (3.37).
EXAMPLE 1:Duplicated functional components (3.21) can be an instance of redundancy for the purpose of increasing availability (3.7) or allowing fault (3.54) detection.
EXAMPLE 2:The addition of parity bits to data representing safety-related information provides redundancy for the purpose of allowing fault (3.54) detection.
3.123 regression strategy
strategy to verify that an implemented change did not affect the unchanged, existing and previously verified parts or properties of an item (3.84) or element (3.41)
3.124 remanufacturing
dismantling and retrofitting a T&B vehicle with new or restored parts after a period of service according to the original specifications
3.125 residual fault
portion of a random hardware fault (3.119) that by itself leads to the violation of a safety goal (3.139), occurring in a hardware element (3.41), where that portion of the random hardware fault (3.119) is not controlled by a safety mechanism (3.142)
Note 1 to entry: This presumes that the hardware element (3.41) has safety mechanism (3.142) coverage for only a portion of its faults (3.54).
EXAMPLE:If a set of faults (3.54) which is safety-relevant and not safe has a subset with 60 % coverage, then the remaining 40 % of the set of faults (3.54) are residual faults.
3.126 residual risk
risk (3.128) remaining after the deployment of safety measures (3.141)
3.127 review
examination of a work product (3.185), for achievement of its intended work product (3.185) goal, according to the purpose of the review
Note 1 to entry: From a development phase (3.110) perspective, verification review (3.181) and confirmation review (3.24).
3.128 risk
combination of the probability of occurrence of harm (3.74) and the severity (3.154) of that harm (3.74)
3.129 robust design
design that can function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental conditions
Note 1 to entry: Robustness can be understood as follows:
? for software, robustness is the ability to respond to abnormal inputs and conditions;
? for hardware, robustness is the ability to be immune to environmental stress and stable over the service life within design limits; and
? in the context of the ISO 26262 series of standards, robustness is the ability to provide safe behaviour at boundaries.
3.130 safe fault
fault (3.54) whose occurrence will not significantly increase the probability of violation of a safety goal (3.139)
Note 1 to entry: As shown in ISO 26262-5:2018, Annex B, both non-safety and safety-related elements (3.144) can have safe faults.
Note 2 to entry: Single-point faults (3.156), residual faults (3.125) and dual-point faults (3.39) do not constitute safe faults.
Note 3 to entry: Unless shown relevant in the safety (3.132) concept, multiple-point faults (3.97) with higher order than 2 can be considered as safe faults.
3.131 safe state
operating mode (3.102), in case of a failure (3.50), of an item (3.84) without an unreasonable level of risk (3.128)
Note 1 to entry: See Figure 5.
Note 2 to entry: While normal operation can be considered safe, the definition of safe state is only in the case of failure (3.50) in the context of the ISO 26262 series of standards.
EXAMPLE:Switched-off mode (for systems (3.163) that are not fault tolerant).
3.132 safety
absence of unreasonable risk (3.176)
3.133 safety activity
activity performed in one or more phases (3.110) or sub-phases (3.161) of the safety (3.132)lifecycle (3.86)
3.134 safety anomaly
conditions that deviate from expectations and that can lead to harm (3.74)
Note 1 to entry: Safety anomalies can be discovered, among other times, during the review (3.127), testing (3.169), analysis, compilation, or use of components (3.21) or applicable documentation.
EXAMPLE:Deviation can be on requirements, specifications, design documents, user documents, standards, or on experience.
3.135 safety architecture
set of elements (3.41) and their interaction to fulfil the safety (3.132) requirements
3.136 safety case
argument that functional safety (3.67) is achieved for items (3.84), or elements (3.41), and satisfied by evidence compiled from workproducts (3.185) of activities during development.
Note 1 to entry: Safety case can be extended to cover safety (3.132) issues beyond the scope the ISO 26262 series of standards.
3.137 safety culture
enduring values, attitudes, motivations and knowledge of an organization in which safety (3.132) is prioritized over competing goals in decisions and behaviour
Note 1 to entry: See ISO 26262-2:2018, Annex B.
3.138 safety element out of context, SEooC
safety-related element (3.144) which is not developed in the context of a specific item (3.84)
Note 1 to entry: A SEooC can be a system (3.163), a combination of systems (3.163), a softwarecomponent (3.157), a software unit (3.159), a hardware component (3.21) or a hardware part (3.71).
EXAMPLE:A generic wiper system (3.163) with assumed safety requirements to be integrated in different OEM systems (3.163).
3.139 safety goal
top-level safety (3.132) requirement as a result of the hazard analysis and risk assessment (3.76) at the vehicle level
Note 1 to entry: One safety goal can be related to several hazards (3.75), and several safety goals can be related to a single hazard (3.75).
3.140 safety manager
person or organization responsible for overseeing and ensuring the execution of activities necessary to achieve functional safety (3.67)
Note 1 to entry: At different levels of the item's (3.84) development, each company involved can appoint one or more different persons by splitting assignment in accordance with the internal matrix organization.
3.141 safety measure
activity or technical solution to avoid or control systematic failures (3.164) and to detect or control random hardware failures (3.118), or mitigate their harmful effects
Note 1 to entry: Safety measures include safety mechanisms (3.142).
EXAMPLE:FMEA, or software without the use of global variables.
3.142 safety mechanism
technical solution implemented by E/E functions or elements (3.41), or by other technologies (3.105), to detect and mitigate or tolerate faults (3.54) or control or avoid failures (3.50) in order to maintain intended functionality (3.83) or achieve or maintain a safe state (3.131)
Note 1 to entry: Safety mechanisms are implemented within the item (3.84) to prevent faults (3.54) from leading to single-point failures (3.155) and to prevent faults (3.54) from being latent faults (3.85).
Note 2 to entry: The safety mechanism is either:
a) able to transition to, or maintain the item (3.84) in a safe state (3.131), or
b) able to alert the driver such that the driver is expected to control the effect of the failure (3.50), as defined in the functional safety concept (3.68).
3.143 safety plan
plan to manage and guide the execution of the safety activities (3.133) of a project including dates, milestones, tasks, deliverables, responsibilities and resources
3.144 safety-related element
element (3.41) that has the potential to contribute to the violation of or achievement of a safety goal (3.139)
Note 1 to entry: Fail-safe elements (3.41) are considered safety-related if they can contribute to at least one safety goal (3.139).
3.145 safety-related function
function that has the potential to contribute to the violation of or achievement of a safety goal (3.139)
3.146 safety-related incident
occurrence of a safety-related failure (3.50)
3.147 safety-related special characteristic
characteristic of an item (3.84) or element (3.41), or their production process, for which reasonably foreseeable deviation could impact, contribute to, or cause any potential reduction of functional safety (3.67)
Note 1 to entry: IATF 16949 defines the term special characteristics.
Note 2 to entry: Safety-related special characteristics are derived during the development phase (3.110) of the item (3.84) or elements (3.41).
Note 3 to entry: A safety related special characteristic is different from and should not be confused with a safety mechanism (3.142).
EXAMPLE:Temperature range; expiration date; fastening torque; production tolerance; configuration.
3.148 safety validation
assurance, based on examination and tests, that the safety goals (3.139) are adequate and have been achieved with a sufficient level of integrity
Note 1 to entry: ISO 26262-4 provides suitable methods for safety validation.
3.149 semi-formal notation
description technique whose syntax is completely defined but whose semantics definition can be incomplete
EXAMPLE:Structured And Design Techniques (SADT); Unified Modeling Language (UML).
3.150 semi-formal verification
verification (3.180) that is based on a description given in semi-formal notation (3.149)
EXAMPLE:Use of test vectors generated from a semi-formal model to test that the system (3.163) behaviour matches the model.
3.151 semi-trailer
trailer (3.171) that is designed to be towed by means of a kingpin coupled to a tractor (3.170) that imposes a substantial vertical load on the towing vehicle
3.152 series production road vehicle
road vehicle that is intended to be used for public roads and is not a prototype
Note 1 to entry: Vehicle type classification may vary between regions.
EXAMPLE 1:A vehicle that is sold for use by the general public.
EXAMPLE 2:A vehicle that is sold to be used amongst the general public.
3.153 service note
documentation of safety (3.132) information to be considered when performing maintenance procedures for the item (3.84)
EXAMPLE:Safety-related special characteristic (3.147); safety (3.132) operation that can be required.
3.154 severity
estimate of the extent of harm (3.74) to one or more individuals that can occur in a potentially hazardous event (3.77)
Note 1 to entry: The parameter “S” in hazard analysis and risk assessment (3.76) represents the potential severity of harm (3.74).
3.155 single-point failure
failure (3.50) that results from a single-point fault (3.156)
3.156 single-point fault
hardware fault (3.54) in an element (3.41) that leads directly to the violation of a safety goal (3.139) and no fault (3.54) in that element (3.41) is covered by any safety mechanism (3.142)
Note 1 to entry: See also single-point failure (3.155).
Note 2 to entry: If at least one safety mechanism (3.142) is defined for a hardware element (3.41) (e.g. a watchdog for a microcontroller), then no faults (3.54) of the considered hardware element (3.41) are single-point faults.
3.157 software component
one or more softwareunits (3.159)
3.158 software tool
computer program used in the development of an item (3.84) or element (3.41)
3.159 software unit
atomic level softwarecomponent (3.157) of the software architecture (3.1) that can be subjected to stand-alone testing (3.169)
3.160 statement coverage
percentage of statements within the software that have been executed
3.161 sub-phase
subdivision of a phase (3.110) in the safety (3.132)lifecycle (3.86) that is specified in a clause of ISO 26262
EXAMPLE:hazard analysis and risk assessment (3.76) is a sub-phase of the safety (3.132)lifecycle (3.86) specified in ISO 26262-3:2018, Clause 6.
3.162 supply agreement
agreement between customer and supplier in which the responsibilities for activities, evidence or workproducts (3.185) to be performed and/or exchanged by each party related to the production of items (3.84) and elements (3.41), are specified
Note 1 to entry: While DIA (3.32) applies to the development phase, supply agreement applies to production.
3.163 system
set of components (3.21) or subsystems that relates at least a sensor, a controller and an actuator with one another
Note 1 to entry: The related sensor or actuator can be included in the system, or can be external to the system.
3.164 systematic failure
failure (3.50) related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, that can only be eliminated by a change of the design or of the manufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant factors
3.165 systematic fault
fault (3.54) whose failure (3.50) is manifested in a deterministic way that can only be prevented by applying process or design measures
3.166 target environment
environment on which specific software is intended to be executed
Note 1 to entry: For application software the target environment is the microcontroller with basic software and operating system. For embedded software (3.42) the target environment is the ECU in the system (3.163) context.
3.167 technical safety concept
specification of the technical safety requirements (3.168) and their allocation to system (3.163)elements (3.41) with associated information providing a rationale for functional safety (3.67) at the system (3.163) level
3.168 technical safety requirement
requirement derived for implementation of associated functional safety requirements (3.69)
Note 1 to entry: The derived requirement includes requirements for mitigation.
3.169 testing
process of planning, preparing, and operating or exercising an item (3.84) or element (3.41) to verify that it satisfies specified requirements, to detect safety anomalies (3.134), to validate that requirements are suitable in the given context and to create confidence in its behaviour
3.170 tractor
truck (3.174) that is designed to tow a semi-trailer (3.151)
3.171 trailer
road vehicle which is designed to be towed such that no substantial part of the total weight is supported by the towing vehicle
Note 1 to entry: A trailer can be designed to transport goods, equipment, or persons.
3.172 transducer
hardware part (3.71) that converts one form of energy into another and has a sensitivity that determines the magnitude of its output energy form relative to the magnitude of its input energy form
3.173 transient fault
fault (3.54) that occurs once and subsequently disappears
Note 1 to entry: Transient faults can appear due to electromagnetic interference, which can lead to bit-flips. Soft errors (3.46) such as Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single Event Transient (SET) are transient faults.
3.174 truck
motor vehicle designed to transport goods, or equipment on-board the chassis
Note 1 to entry: It may also tow a trailer (3.171).
3.175 T&B vehicle configuration
technical characteristics of a T&B base vehicle (3.9) and body builder equipment (3.12) that do not change during operation
Note 1 to entry: Changes may occur during rebuilding (3.121).
EXAMPLE:Wheel base, axle load distribution, wheels (number of axles, driven axles, steered axles).
3.176 unreasonable risk
risk (3.128) judged to be unacceptable in a certain context according to valid societal moral concepts
3.177 variance in T&B vehicle operation
use of a T&B vehicle with different dynamic characteristics influenced by cargo or towing during the service life of the vehicle
EXAMPLE:T&B with or without load, T&B with variations in load distribution, truck (3.174) with or without trailer (3.171), tractor (3.170) with or without semi-trailer (3.151) (tractor (3.170) solo).
3.178 vehicle function
behaviour of the vehicle, intended by the implementation of one or more items (3.84), that is observable by the customer
EXAMPLE:An “automatic cruise control” is a vehicle function that can be implemented, using different ECUs and a variety of sensor technology (e.g. Radar, Lidar, Camera).
3.179 vehicle operating state
operating mode (3.102) in combination with the operational situation (3.104)
Note 1 to entry: The vehicle operating state is determined by the currently provided performance of the specified functionality (e.g. highly automated driving) within the current driving situation (e.g. on the highway at 120 km/h). The ASIL (3.6) rating of the hazardous event (3.77) (e.g. sudden loss of the specified functionality) is dependent on the current vehicle operating state (e.g. sudden loss of highly automated driving capability is more critical at high speeds than at very low speeds); sudden loss of highly automated driving capability at high speeds is not an issue if the system (3.163) is not in operation, i.e. the system (3.163) fails while the driver is in control.
3.180 verification
determination whether or not an examined object meets its specified requirements
EXAMPLE:The typical verification activities can be classified as follows:
? verification review (3.181), walk-through (3.182), inspection (3.82);
? verification testing (3.169);
? simulation;
? prototyping; and
? analysis (safety (3.132) analysis, control flow analysis, data flow analysis, etc.).
3.181 verification review
verification (3.180) activity to ensure that the result of a development activity fulfils the project requirements, or technical requirements, or both
Note 1 to entry: Individual requirements on verification reviews are given in specific clauses of individual parts of the ISO 26262 series of standards.
Note 2 to entry: The goal of verification reviews is technical correctness and completeness of the item (3.84) or element (3.41).
EXAMPLE:Verification review types can be technical review (3.127), walk-through (3.182) or inspection (3.82).
3.182 walk-through
systematic examination of work products (3.185) in order to detect safety anomalies (3.134)
Note 1 to entry: Walk-through is a means of verification (3.180).
Note 2 to entry: Walk-through differs from testing (3.169) in that it does not normally involve the operation of the associated item (3.84) or element (3.41).
Note 3 to entry: Any anomalies that are detected are usually addressed by rework, followed by a walk-through of the reworked work products (3.185).
EXAMPLE:During a walk-through, the developer explains the work product (3.185) step-by-step to one or more reviewers. The objective is to create a common understanding of the work product (3.185) and to identify any safety anomalies (3.134) within the work product (3.185). Both inspections (3.82) and walk-throughs are types of peer review (3.127), where a walk-through is a less stringent form of peer review (3.127) than an inspection (3.82).
3.183 warning and degradation strategy
specification of how to alert the driver of potentially reduced functionality and of how to provide this reduced functionality to reach a safe state (3.131)
Note 1 to entry: The warning and degradation strategy includes:
? the specification of haptic, audio or visual cues to alert the driver for upcoming degradation (3.28);
? the description of one or more safe states (3.131) associated with the corresponding safety goals (3.139);
? the conditions for transitioning to a safe state (3.131);
? the conditions for recovering from a safe state (3.131) and, if applicable, the corresponding maximum time to repair time interval (3.89); and
? if applicable, emergency operation (3.43) and associated emergency operation tolerance time interval (3.45).
3.184 well-trusted
previously used without known safety anomalies (3.134) in a comparable application
EXAMPLE:Well-trusted design principle; well-trusted tool; well-trusted hardware component (3.21).
3.185 work product
documentation resulting from one or more associated requirements of ISO 26262
Note 1 to entry: The documentation can be in the form of a single document containing the complete information for the work product or a set of documents that together contain the complete information for the work product.

＜この記事は個人の過去の経験に基づく個人の感想です。現在所属する組織、業務とは関係がありません。＞

参考資料

自動車ソフトウェア三規格参考文献
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/def6176e74e8cd13ca79

自動車ソフトウェア三規格参考文献の参考文献
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/4595182168a2f7b0aa32

サイバー攻撃に防衛隊を組織教育
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/5bc6235c509e4fb108f0
物理記事　上位100
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/66e90fe31fbe3facc6ff

数学関連記事１００
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/d8dadb49a6397e854c6d

言語・文学記事　１００
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/42d58d5ef7fb53c407d6

医工連携関連記事一覧
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/6ab51c12ba51bc260a82

通信記事１００
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/1d67de5e1cd207b05ef7

自動車　記事　１００
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/f7f0b9ab36569ad409c5

Qiita(0)Qiita関連記事一覧（自分）
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/58db5fbf036b28e9dfa6

鉄道（０）鉄道のシステム考察はてっちゃんがてつだってくれる
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/26bda595f341a27901a0

日本語（０）一欄
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/7498dcfa3a9ba7fd1e68

英語(0) 一覧
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/680e3f5cbf9430486c7d

転職(0)一覧
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/f77520d378d33451d6fe

仮説（0）一覧（目標100現在40）
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/f000506fe1837b3590df

安全（0）安全工学シンポジウムに向けて: 21
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/c5d78f3def8195cb2409

Error一覧 error(0)
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/48b6cbc8d68eae2c42b8

Ethernet 記事一覧　Ethernet(0)
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/88d35e99f74aefc98794

Wireshark 一覧 wireshark(0)、Ethernet(48)
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/fbed841f61875c4731d0

線網（Wi-Fi）空中線(antenna)(0) 記事一覧(118/300目標)
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/5e5464ac2b24bd4cd001

OSEK OS設計の基礎　OSEK(100)
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/7528a22a14242d2d58a3

官公庁・学校・公的団体（NPOを含む）システムの課題、官（０）
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/04ee6eaf7ec13d3af4c3

Error一覧(C/C++, python, bash...) Error(0)
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/48b6cbc8d68eae2c42b8

C++ Support(0)　
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/8720d26f762369a80514

Coding Rules(0) C Secure , MISRA and so on
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/400725644a8a0e90fbb0

なぜdockerで機械学習するか 書籍・ソース一覧作成中 (目標100)
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/ddd12477544bf5ba85e2

言語処理100本ノックをdockerで。python覚えるのに最適。:10+12
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/7e7eb7c543e0c18438c4

プログラムちょい替え（0）一覧:4件
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/296d87ef4bfd516bc394

TOPPERSまとめ　#名古屋のIoTは名古屋のOSで
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/9026c049cb0309b9d451

自動制御、制御工学一覧（０）
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/7767a4e19a6ae1479e6b

プログラマが知っていると良い「公序良俗」
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/9fe7c0dfac2fbd77a945

一覧の一覧( The directory of directories of mine.) Qiita(100)
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/7eb0e006543886138f39

小川清最終講義、小川清最終講義（再）計画, Ethernet(100) 英語(100) 安全(100)
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/e2df642e3951e35e6a53

＜この記事は個人の過去の経験に基づく個人の感想です。現在所属する組織、業務とは関係がありません。＞
This article is an individual impression based on the individual's experience. It has nothing to do with the organization or business to which I currently belong.

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ver. 0.01 初稿 20231019

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