AUTOSARが2023年版、R(Release)23-11を公開しました。
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R23-11/CP/AUTOSAR_CP_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf
R22-11
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R22-11/CP/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf
R21-11
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R21-11/CP/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf
R20-11
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R20-11/CP/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf
R19-11
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R19-11/CP/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf
文書は検索してダウンロードできます。
https://www.autosar.org/
<この項は書きかけです。順次追記します。>
This article is not completed. I will add some words in order.
Release Overviews
AUTOSARには現在3つの分類があります。Foundation, CAN OSEK/VDXのClassic Platform, Ethernet/TCP/IP POSIXのAdaptive Platform.
Foundation Release Overview, AUTOSAR 781, R23-11, FO
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/f249bdb8c313d8bff883
Classic Platform Release Overview, AUTOSAR No.0 ,R23-11, CP
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/9d22c8722cbc0f42b137
Adaptive Platform Release Overview, AUTOSAR 782, R23-11, AP
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/13a104606a34fe24fcf7
Qiita 記事一覧
Autosar Foundation R23-11 一覧
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/c30674cb2dac2fcbbd04
AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform R23-11一覧
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/1dece8799a730367b0dc
Autosar Classic Platform R23-11 一覧
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/f770f6c2906e1dcbf180
文書変更(Document Change)
Updated naming of Security Events for IdsM
Minor corrections / clarifications / editorial changes
用語(terms)
| term | Description |
|---|---|
| CSM | The AUTOSAR Crypto Service Manager |
| SecOC | Secure Onboard Communication |
| MAC | Message Authentication Code |
| FV | Freshness Value |
| FM | Freshness Manager |
| Authentic I-PDU | An Authentic I-PDU is an arbitrary AUTOSAR I-PDU the content of which is secured during network transmission by means of the Secured I-PDU. The secured content comprises the complete I-PDU or a part of the IPDU. |
| Authentication | Authentication is a service related to identification. This function applies to both entities and information itself. Two parties entering into a communication should identify each other. Information delivered over a channel should be authenticated as to origin, date of origin, data content, time sent, etc. For these reasons, this aspect of cryptography is usually subdivided into two major classes: entity authentication and data origin authentication. Data origin authentication implicitly provides data integrity (for if a message is modified, the source has changed). |
| Authentication Information | The Authentication Information consists of a Freshness Value (or a part thereof) and an Authenticator (or a part thereof). Authentication Information are the additional pieces of information that are added by SecOC to realize the Secured I-PDU |
| Authenticator | Authenticator is data that is used to provide message authentication. In general, the term Message Authentication Code (MAC) is used for symmetric approaches while the term Signature or Digital Signature refers to asymmetric approaches having different properties and constraints. |
| Data integrity | Data integrity is the property whereby data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since the time it was created, transmitted, or stored by an authorized source. To assure data integrity, one should have the ability to detect data manipulation by unauthorized parties. Data manipulation includes such things as insertion, deletion, and substitution. |
| Data origin authentication | Data origin authentication is a type of authentication whereby a party is corroborated as the (original) source of specified data created at some (typically unspecified) time in the past. By definition, data origin authentication includes data integrity. |
| Distinction unilateral/bilateral authentication | In unilateral authentication, one side proves identity. The requesting side is not even authenticated to the extent of proving that it is allowed to request authentication. In bilateral authentication, the requester is also authenticated at least (see below) to prove the privilege of requesting. There is an efficient and more secure way to authenticate both endpoints, based on the bilateral authentication described above. Along with the authentication (in the second message) requested initially by the receiver (in the first message), the sender also requests an authentication. The receiver sends a third message providing the authentication requested by the sender. This is only three messages (in contrast to four with two unilateral messages). |
| Entity authentication | Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured (through acquisition of corroborative evidence) of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the evidence is acquired). Note: Entity authentication means to prove presence and operational readiness of a communication endpoint. This is for example often done by proving access to a cryptographic key and knowledge of a secret.It is necessary to do this without disclosing either key or secret.Entity authentication can be used to prevent record-and-replay attacks. Freshness of messages only complicates them by the need to record a lifetime and corrupt either senders or receivers (real-time) clock.Entity authentication is triggered by the receiver, i.e. the one to be convinced, while the sender has to react by convincing. Record and replay attacks on entity authentication are usually prevented by allowing the receiver some control over the authentication process.In order to prevent the receiver from using this control for steering the sender to malicious purposes or from determining a key or a secret ("oracle attack"), the sender can add more randomness.If not only access to a key (implying membership to a privileged group) but also individuality is to be proven, the sender additionally adds and authenticates its unique identification. |
| Message authentication | Message authentication is a term used analogously with data origin authentication. It provides data origin authentication with respect to the original message source (and data integrity, but no uniqueness and timeliness guarantees). |
| Secured I-PDU | A Secured I-PDU is an AUTOSAR I-PDU that contains Payload of an Authentic I-PDU supplemented by additional Authentication Information. |
| Transaction authentication | Transaction authentication denotes message authentication augmented to additionally provide uniqueness and timeliness guarantees on data (thus preventing undetectable message replay). |
References
Glossaryも掲載しましょう。
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R23-11/FO/AUTOSAR_FO_TR_Glossary.pdf
[1] AUTOSAR Layered Software Architecture AUTOSAR_CP_EXP_LayeredSoftwareArchitecture.pdf
[2] AUTOSAR General Requirements on Basic Software Modules AUTOSAR_CP_SRS_BSWGeneral.pdf
[3] AUTOSAR General Specification for Basic Software Modules AUTOSAR_CP_SWS_BSWGeneral.pdf
[4] Specification of Communication
AUTOSAR_CP_SWS_COM - Specification of Communication
[5] AUTOSAR SecOC Software Requirements Specification AUTOSAR_CP_SRS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf
[6] Specification of I-PDU Multiplexer AUTOSAR_CP_SWS_I-PDUMultiplexer.pdf
[7] Specification of PDU Router AUTOSAR_CP_SWS_PduRouter.pdf
[8] Specification of Crypt Service Manager AUTOSAR_CP_SWS_CryptoServiceManager.pdf
[9] System Template,
https://svn3.autosar.org/repos2/work/24_Sources/branches/R4.0/TPS_SystemTe mplate_063/AUTOSAR_TPS_SystemTemplate.pdf
[10] Software Component Template,
https://svn3.autosar.org/repos2/work/24_Sources/branches/R4.0/TPS_SoftwareC omponentTemplate_062/AUTOSAR_TPS_SoftwareComponentTemplate.pdf
[11] Koscher et al: Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile, 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
[12] Checkoway et al: Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces, USENIX Security 2011
[13] Auguste Kerckhoffs, ‘La cryptographie militaire’, Journal des sciences militaires, vol. IX, pp. 5–38, Jan. 1883, pp. 161–191, Feb. 1883.
[14] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996.
[15] Danny Dolev and Andrew C. Yao: On the security of public key protocols, In Foundations of Computer Science, SFCS 1981
[16] M. Dworkin: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, U.S. Department of Commerce, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, USA, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, 2005
3.2 Related standards and norms
[17] IEC 7498-1 The Basic Model, IEC Norm, 1994
[18] Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012, available electronically at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): FIPS-180-4, Secure
[19] FIPS Pub 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), U.S. Department of Commerce, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, USA, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, 2001, electronically available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
補足資料（Additions）
祝休日・謹賀新年：2024年の目標
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/b659d922327a7dcdc898
2023 Countdown Calendar 主催・参加一覧
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/c4c2f08ac97f38d08543
CountDownCalendar月間 いいねをいただいた記事群 views 順
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/583c5cbc225dac23398a
Countdown Calendar 2023, 百記事目を書くにあたって。
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/45185a04cfd88b71256a
1年間をまとめた「振り返りページ」＠２０２３
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/bcd1ebd49d3a9e8c7a90
AUTOSAR 文書番号
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/8b894228a0b76c2265c7
AUTOSAR R23-11 記憶の記録
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/701bc800b5f137e51a36
AUTOSAR Countdown Calendar 2023
https://qiita.com/advent-calendar/2023/autosar
AUTOSAR Abstract Platformへの道 R22-11
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/8ac2826635a8c536c7ec
自動車 記事 １００
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/f7f0b9ab36569ad409c5
Basic principles, ボッシュ自動車handbook(英語)11版まとめ<2>
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/24a1ba5da3d09b2a95d1
JAXA/IPA クリティカルソフトウェアワークショップ WOCS言語関連発表(改定版)
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/4789832baf494cb74626
＜この記事は個人の過去の経験に基づく個人の感想です。現在所属する組織、業務とは関係がありません。＞
This article is an individual impression based on the individual's experience. It has nothing to do with the organization or business to which I currently belong.
文書履歴(document history)
ver. 0.01 初稿 20240122
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