Specification of Secure Onboard Communication Protocol(SecOC) , AUTOSAR 969, R22-11, FO, 20230421

AUTOSARは自動車用OSの業界団体規格です。　
業務で利用する場合には、会員になることを条件にしています。

2002年から20年経ち、当初の狙いの段階に近づいてきました。

MATLABでモデルさえ記述すれば、あとは自動生成だけでソフトが完成するところまで、あと一歩です。
Ethernet, UNIXが生まれて20年で大衆化したのと同じように考えると分かりやすいでしょう。　

AUTOSARの上で動く、クラウド対応のミドルウェアが出て、開発も運用もクラウドになれば、一気にAUTOSARは大衆化するでしょう。

AUTOSAR Abstract Platformへの道 R22-11

＜この記事は書きかけです。順次追記します。＞
This article is not completed. I will add some words in order.

2023年4月URL変更

この項は2023年4月21日、AUTOSARの文書のURLが変更になった。
/classic/22-11/
が
/R22-11/CP/
過去記事で、URLでエラーが出たら書き換えてみてください。

/adaptive/22-11/
は　
/R22-11/AP/

/foundation/22-11/
は　
/R22-11/FO/
です。

2023年11月URL変更

2023年11月にもAUTOSAR文書のURLが変更になっている。
/user_upload/standards/classic/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/CP/
などに書き換えてください。

/user_upload/standards/adaptive/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/AP/

/user_upload/standards/foundation/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/FO/

お手数をおかけします。
１年に２度URLを変更するなんて、新しい記事が書ける。とても嬉しい。

一覧

AUTOSAR R22-11 Qiita記事一覧 20230421 。

この記事の表題の最後に「20230421」を加えます。

AUTOSARが、2022年の版、R22-11を公開しました。

R21-11

R20-11

R19-11

文書は検索してダウンロードできます。

R20-11,R21-11, R22-11の３年分だけになりました。

公開行事の模様は

AUTOSAR R22-11 Release Event 20221208

Classic Platform Release Overview, AUTOSAR No.0 ,R22-11, CP, 20230421

Foundation Release Overview, AUTOSAR, 781, R22-11, FO, 20230421

Adaptive Platform Release Overview, AUTOSAR 782, R22-11, AP, 20230421

要求仕様対応(Requirement and Specification)

Abstract Platformとの関係

セキュリティ統合

文書変更(Document Change)

• Removal of implementation specific contents
• Update of configuration parameters • Editorial changes

Document Title	Specification of Secure Onboard Communication Protocol
Document Owner	AUTOSAR
Document Responsibility	AUTOSAR
Document Identification No	969
Document Status	published
Part of AUTOSAR Standard	Foundation
Part of Standard Release	R21-11

Document Change R21 - 11

no content changes(20-11がinitial release)

そんな。initial releaseから見直しがないなんて。

NISTのURLはだいぶ前に変わっているのに変更がない。とっても残念な人たちなのだろうか。
あるいは、そんなことは自分で調べろっていう競争領域なのだろうか。
あるいは、そんなことができないやつは、仕事するなっている敷居だろうか。

1.2.1 Constraints and assumptions
This chapter has no content.

英語が間違いなのか、英語の表現が間違いなのか、内容が間違いなのか、内容のないChapter（章）の見出しがあるのはちょっと引いちゃう。

制約や仮定のないセキュリティは存在しないはずだし、、、。

Dependencies

[1] IEC 7498-1 The Basic Model, IEC Norm, 1994
[2] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): FIPS-180-4, Secure Hash
Standard (SHS), March 2012, available electronically at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
[3] FIPS Pub 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), U.S. Department of Commerce, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, USA, Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication, 2001, electronically available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf

英日単語帳

日本語は仮訳

no.	count	word	日本語
1	659	the	その
2	308	of	の
3	194	to	に
4	181	i	私
5	180	pdu	Protocol Data Unit（短縮名）
6	163	and	と
7	142	secoc	Secure Onboard Communication（短縮名）
8	138	freshness	鮮度
9	135	a	一つの
10	122	authentication	認証
11	120	is	です
12	120	prs_secoc_	prs_secoc_
13	97	value	価値
14	95	in	の中に
15	93	secured	確保
16	93	shall	しなければならない
17	86	be	です
18	66	authentic	本物
19	66	length	長さ
20	63	for	にとって
21	60	authenticator	検証器
22	58	data	与件
23	58	this	これ
24	56	by	に
25	54	c	c
26	54	module	部品
27	53	communication	通信
28	52	protocol	規約
29	50	or	または
30	49	parameter	引数
31	49	rs_main_	rs_main_
32	47	not	いいえ
33	45	autosar	AUTomotive Open System Architecture(短縮名)
34	44	as	なので
35	42	secure	安心
36	41	mac	Message Authentication Code（短縮名）
37	41	that	それ
38	41	verification	検証
39	39	counter	計数器
40	39	document	文書
41	39	specification	仕様
42	38	used	使った
43	37	an	一つの
44	37	information	情報
45	35	configuration	構成
46	34	if	もし
47	33	message	伝言
48	33	onboard	板上で
49	32	has	もつ
50	32	on	の上
51	31	id	identifier, 識別子(短縮名）
52	31	r	r
53	30	algorithm	算法
54	30	are	それは
55	30	bits	binary digits(短縮名）
56	28	autosar_prs_secocprotocol	autosar_prs_secocprotocol
57	28	fo	foundation(短縮名）
58	28	it	それ
59	27	no	いいえ
60	24	from	から
61	24	truncated	切り捨てた
62	24	with	と
63	23	build	作る
64	23	cryptographic	暗号
65	23	dif	difference(短縮名）
66	23	function	関数
67	23	side	側
68	21	d	d
69	21	e	e
70	21	trunc	切り捨て
71	21	use	使用する
72	19	key	鍵
73	19	set	設定する
74	18	case	場合
75	18	pdus	Protocol Data Units(短縮名）
76	17	error	誤り
77	17	srs_bsw_	srs_bsw_
78	16	bit	少し
79	16	example	例
80	16	verify	確認
81	15	all	すべて
82	15	note	覚書
83	15	part	部
84	14	at	で
85	14	fips	Federal Information Processing Standards(短縮名）
86	14	nist	National Institute of Standards and Technology(短縮名）
87	14	profile	横顔
88	14	received	受け取った
89	14	receiver	受信器
90	13	layer	層
91	13	security	安全
92	13	specific	明確
93	13	transmission	転送
94	12	any	どれか
95	12	each	各
96	12	g	g
97	12	info	情報
98	12	its	これは
99	12	only	それだけ
100	12	payload	負荷
101	12	sending	送信
102	12	should	したほうがいい
103	12	signature	署名

Reference

Glossary も　参考に入れましょう。
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R22-11/FO/AUTOSAR_TR_Glossary.pdf

1.3.2 Dependencies to other standards and norms に１−３を再掲している。２箇所に表記するのは無駄。
Referenceに4がある。URLの文書は廃止(withdraw)していて新しい文書がある。大きな違いは、最後の３ページのExamplesを削除している。

[1] IEC 7498-1 The Basic Model, IEC Norm, 1994

AUTOSARでよくある間違い。コピペして、確認していないことが分かる。

ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994
Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — Basic Reference Model: The Basic Model

[2] FIPS-180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS),

March 2012, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST):

available electronically at

[3] FIPS Pub 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),

U.S. Department of Com- merce, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, USA, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, 2001,

electronically available at

[4] NIST Special Publication 800-38B: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication

Withdrawn on October 06, 2016. Superseded by SP 800-38B

SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode for Authentication

May 2005 (Updated 10/6/2016)

Appendix E: Bibliography on SP 800-38B

[1] J. Black, P. Rogaway, A Suggestion for Handling Arbitrary-Length Messages with the CBC MAC, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. [Web page], http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/workshops.html#01.

[2] J. Black, P. Rogaway, “CBC MACs for arbitrary-length messages: The three-key constructions,” in Advances in Cryptology—Crypto 2000, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1880, Mihir Bellare, ed., Springer-Verlag (2000), pp. 197–215. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44598-6_12.

[3] FIPS Publication 197, The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), U.S. DoC/NIST, November 26, 2001. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf.

[4] FIPS Publication 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), U.S. DoC/NIST, July 2008. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198- 1_final.pdf.

[5] T. Iwata, K. Kurosawa, OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. [Web page], http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/modes_development.html.

[6] T. Iwata, K. Kurosawa, “OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC,” in Fast Software Encryption, 10th International Workshop, FSE 2003, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 2887, Thomas Johansson, ed., Springer-Verlag (2003), pp. 129–153.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39887-5_11.

[7] T. Iwata, K. Kurosawa, OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC—Addendum, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. [Web page],
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/modes_development.html.

[8] T. Iwata, K. Kurosawa, Stronger Security Bounds for OMAC, TMAC, and XCBC, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. [Web page], http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/comments.html.

[9] A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, Inc., Boca Raton (1996).

[10] NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, January 2012, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. [Web page],

https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-67r1.

short name, term

aka(also known as) Acronyms and abbreviations

Term	Description
SecOC	Secure Onboard Communication
MAC	Message Authentication Code
FV	Freshness Value
FM	Freshness Manager
Authentic I-PDU	An Authentic I-PDU is an arbitrary AUTOSAR I-PDU the content of which is secured during network transmission by means of the Secured I-PDU. The secured content comprises the complete IPDU or a part of the I-PDU.
Authentication	Authentication is a service related to identification. This function applies to both entities and information itself. Two parties entering into a communication should identify each other. Information delivered over a channel should be authenticated as to origin, date of origin, data content, time sent, etc. For these reasons, this aspect of cryptography is usually subdivided into two major classes: entity authentication and data origin authentication. Data origin authentication implicitly provides data integrity (for if a message is modified, the source has changed).
Authentication Information	The Authentication Information consists of a Freshness Value (or a part thereof) and an Authenticator (or a part thereof). Authentication Information are the additional pieces of information that are added by SecOC to realize the Secured I-PDU.
Authenticator	Authenticator is data that is used to provide message authentication. In general, the term Message Authentication Code (MAC) is used for symmetric approaches while the term Signature or Digital Signature refers to asymmetric approaches having different properties and constraints.
Data integrity	Data integrity is the property whereby data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since the time it was created, transmitted, or stored by an authorized source. To assure data integrity, one should have the ability to detect data manipulation by unauthorized parties. Data manipulation includes such things as insertion, deletion, and substitution.
Data origin authentication	Data origin authentication is a type of authentication whereby a party is corroborated as the (original) source of specified data created at some (typically unspecified) time in the past. By definition, data origin authentication includes data integrity.
Distinction unilateral / bilateral authentication	In unilateral authentication, one side proves identity. The requesting side is not even authenticated to the extent of proving that it is allowed to request authentication. In bilateral authentication, the requester is also authenticated at least (see below) to prove the privilege of requesting. There is an efficient and more secure way to authenticate both endpoints, based on the bilateral authentication described above. Along with the authentication (in the second message) requested initially by the receiver (in the first message), the sender also requests an authentication. The receiver sends a third message providing the authentication requested by the sender. This is only three messages (in contrast to four with two unilateral messages).
Entity authentication	Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured (through acquisition of corroborative evidence) of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the evidence is acquired). Note: Entity authentication means to prove presence and operational readiness of a communication endpoint. This is for example often done by proving access to a cryptographic key and knowledge of a secret. It is necessary to do this without disclosing either key or secret. Entity authentication can be used to prevent record-and-replay attacks. Freshness of messages only complicates them by the need to record a lifetime and corrupt either senders or receivers (real-time) clock. Entity authentication is triggered by the receiver, i.e. the one to be convinced, while the sender has to react by convincing. Record and replay attacks on entity authentication are usually prevented by allowing the receiver some control over the authentication process. In order to prevent the receiver from using this control for steering the sender to malicious purposes or from determining a key or a secret ("oracle attack"), the sender can add more randomness. If not only access to a key (implying membership to a privileged group) but also individuality is to be proven, the sender additionally adds and authenticates its unique identification.
Message authentication	Message authentication is a term used analogously with data origin authentication. It provides data origin authentication with respect to the original message source (and data integrity, but no uniqueness and timeliness guarantees).
Secured I-PDU	A Secured I-PDU is an AUTOSAR I-PDU that contains Payloadof an Authentic I-PDU supplemented by additional Authentication Information.
Transaction authentication	Transaction authentication denotes message authentication augmented to additionally provide uniqueness and timeliness guarantees on data (thus preventing undetectable message replay).

SecOC Profile

5.4.2 SecOC Profile 1 (or 24Bit-CMAC-8Bit-FV)

5.4.3 SecOC Profile 2 (or 24Bit-CMAC-No-FV)

5.4.4 SecOC Profile 3 (or JASPAR)

誤
[1] IEC 7498-1 The Basic Model, IEC Norm, 1994
正
[1] ISO 7498-1 The Basic Model, IEC Norm, 1994

関連文書(Related document)

AUTOSAR Abstract Platformへの道 R22-11

自動車　記事　１００

Basic principles, ボッシュ自動車handbook(英語)11版まとめ<2>

JAXA/IPA クリティカルソフトウェアワークショップ WOCS言語関連発表(改定版)

CAN(controller area network)

「はじめてのCAN/CANFD 」 ベクタージャパン ＜エンジニア夏休み企画>【読書感想文】

三方良し　Udemy 車載LAN入門講座 CAN通信編

詳解 車載ネットワーク CAN, CAN FD, LIN, CXPI, Ethernetの仕組みと設計のために(1) 著者　 ＜エンジニア夏休み企画 読書感想文＞

詳解 車載ネットワーク CAN, CAN FD, LIN, CXPI, Ethernetの仕組みと設計のために(2)参考文献 ＜エンジニア夏休み企画>【読書感想文】

詳解 車載ネットワーク CAN、CAN FD、LIN、CXPI、Ethernetの仕組みと設計のために

R23-11

＜この記事は個人の過去の経験に基づく個人の感想です。現在所属する組織、業務とは関係がありません。＞
This article is an individual impression based on the individual's experience. It has nothing to do with the organization or business to which I currently belong.

文書履歴(document history)

ver. 0.01 初稿　　20230812

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