AUTOSARは自動車用OSの業界団体規格です。　
業務で利用する場合には、会員になることを条件にしています。

2002年から20年経ち、当初の狙いの段階に近づいてきました。

MATLABでモデルさえ記述すれば、あとは自動生成だけでソフトが完成するところまで、あと一歩です。
Ethernet, UNIXが生まれて20年で大衆化したのと同じように考えると分かりやすいでしょう。　

AUTOSARの上で動く、クラウド対応のミドルウェアが出て、開発も運用もクラウドになれば、一気にAUTOSARは大衆化するでしょう。

AUTOSAR Abstract Platformへの道 R22-11

2023年4月URL変更

この項は2023年4月21日、AUTOSARの文書のURLが変更になった。
/classic/22-11/
が
/R22-11/CP/
過去記事で、URLでエラーが出たら書き換えてみてください。

/adaptive/22-11/
は　
/R22-11/AP/

/foundation/22-11/
は　
/R22-11/FO/
です。

2023年11月URL変更

2023年11月にもAUTOSAR文書のURLが変更になっている。
/user_upload/standards/classic/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/CP/
などに書き換えてください。

/user_upload/standards/adaptive/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/AP/

/user_upload/standards/foundation/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/FO/

お手数をおかけします。
１年に２度URLを変更するなんて、新しい記事が書ける。とても嬉しい。

一覧

AUTOSAR R22-11 Qiita記事一覧 20230421 。

この記事の表題の最後に「20230421」を加えます。

<この項は書きかけです。順次追記します。>

AUTOSARが、2022年の版、R22-11を公開しました。

R21-11

R20-11

R19-11

文書は検索してダウンロードできます。

R20-11,R21-11, R22-11の３年分だけになりました。

公開行事の模様は

AUTOSAR R22-11 Release Event 20221208

Classic Platform Release Overview, AUTOSAR No.0 ,R22-11, CP, 20230421

Foundation Release Overview, AUTOSAR, 781, R22-11, FO, 20230421

Adaptive Platform Release Overview, AUTOSAR 782, R22-11, AP, 20230421

要求仕様対応(Requirement and Specification)

Abstract Platformとの関係

暗号、セキュリティ文書統合。

<この項は書きかけです。順次追記します。>

文書変更(Document Change)

New Feature: Addition of the CsmCustom service for vendor customized security services.
 Removal of certificate functionality (moved to KeyM and replaced by CsmCustom services)
 Editorial changes

用語(terms)

Term	Description
AEAD	Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
CDD	Complex Device Driver
CSM	Crypto Service Manager
CRYIF	Crypto Interface
CRYPTO	Crypto Driver
DET	Default Error Tracer
HSM	Hardware Security Module
HW	Hardware
SHE	Security Hardware Extension
SW	Software
Crypto Driver　Object	A Crypto Driver implements one or more Crypto Driver Objects.　The Crypto Driver Object can offer different crypto primitives in　hardware or software. The Crypto Driver Objects of one Crypto　Driver are independent of each other.　There is only one workspace for each Crypto Driver Object (i.e.　only one crypto primitive can be performed at the same time)
Key	A Key can be referenced by a job in the Csm.　In the Crypto Driver, the key refers a specific key type.
Key Type	A key type consists of refers to key elements.　The key types are typically pre-configured by the vendor of the　Crypto Driver.
Key Element	Key elements are used to store data. This data can be e.g. key　material or the IV needed for AES encryption.　It can also be used to configure the behaviour oft he key　management functions.
Job	A Job is a configured 'CsmJob'. Among others, it refers to a key, a　cryptographic primitive and a reference channel.
Channel	A channel is the path from a Crypto Service Manager queue via the　Crypto Interface to a specific Crypto Driver Object.
Primitive	A primitive is an instance of a configured cryptographic algorithm　realized in a Crypto Driver Object. Among others it refers to a　functionality provided by the CSM to the application, the concrete　underlining 'algorithmfamily' (e.g. AES, MD5, RSA, etc.), and a　'algorithmmode' (e.g. ECB, CBC, etc).
Operation	An operation of a crypto primitive declares what part of the crypto　primitive shall be performed. There are three different operations:　It is also possible to perform more than one operation at once by　concatenating the corresponding bits of the operation_mode　argument.
START	Operation indicates a new request of a crypto primitive,　it shall cancel all previous requests perform necessary　initializations and checks if the crypto primitive can be　processed.
UPDATE	Operation indicates, that the crypto primitive expect　input data. An update operation may provide　intermediate results.
FINISH	Operation indicates, that after this part all data are fed　completely and the crypto primitive can finalize the　calculations. A finish operation may provide final　results.
Priority	The priority of a job defines the importance of it. The higher the　priority (as well in value), the more immediate the job will be　executed. The priority of a cryptographic job is part of the　configuration.
Processing	Indicates the kind of job processing.
Asynchronous	The job is not processed immediately when calling a　corresponding function. Usually, the caller is informed　via a callback function when the job has been finished.
Synchronous	The job is processed immediately when calling a　corresponding function. When the function returns, a　result will be available.
Service	A service shall be understand as defined in the TR_Glossary　document: A service is a type of operation that has a published　specification of interface and behavior, involving a contract between　the provider of the capability and the potential clients.

英日

日本語は仮訳

T.B.D.

参考(reference)

[1] List of Basic Software Modules
AUTOSAR_TR_BSWModuleList.pdf
[2] Layered Software Architecture
AUTOSAR_EXP_LayeredSoftwareArchitecture.pdf
[3] General Requirements on Basic Software Modules
AUTOSAR_SRS_BSWGeneral.pdf
[4] Specification of RTE Software
AUTOSAR_SWS_RTE.pdf
[5] Specification of BSW Scheduler
AUTOSAR_SWS_Scheduler.pdf
[6] Specification of ECU Configuration
AUTOSAR_TPS_ECUConfiguration.pdf
[7] Specification of Memory Mapping
AUTOSAR_SWS_MemoryMapping.pdf
[8] Specification of Default Error Tracer
AUTOSAR_SWS_DefaultErrorTracer.doc.pdf
[9] Specification of Diagnostic Event Manager
AUTOSAR_SWS_DiagnosticEventManager.pdf
[10] Specification of ECU State Manager
AUTOSAR_SWS_ECUStateManager.pdf
[11] Specification of C Implementation Rules
AUTOSAR_TR_CImplementationRules.pdf
[12] Specification of Standard Types
AUTOSAR_SWS_StandardTypes.pdf
[13] AUTOSAR Glossary, AUTOSAR_TR_Glossary.pdf
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R22-11/FO/AUTOSAR_TR_Glossary.pdf
[14] Requirements on the Crypto Stack
AUTOSAR_SRS_CryptoStack.pdf
[15] Specification of the Crypto Interface
AUTOSAR_SWS_CryptoInterface.pdf
[16] Specification of the Crypto Driver
AUTOSAR_SWS_CryptoDriver.pdf
[17] General Specification of Basic Software Modules
AUTOSAR_SWS_BSWGeneral.pdf

[18] IEC 7498-1 The Basic Model, IEC Norm, 1994

前出 ISO/IEC 7498-1

[19] IETF RFC5 639 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, 2010

References

7.1. Normative References

[ANSI1] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", ANSI
X9.62, 2005.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.

7.2. Informative References

[ANSI2] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: Key
Agreement and Key Transport Using The Elliptic Curve
Cryptography", ANSI X9.63, 2001.

[BJ] Brier, E. and M. Joyce, "Fast Multiplication on Elliptic
Curves through Isogenies", Applied Algebra Algebraic
Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 2643, Springer Verlag, 2003.

[BG] Brown, J. and R. Gallant, "The Static Diffie-Hellman
Problem", Centre for Applied Cryptographic Research,
University of Waterloo, Technical Report CACR 2004-10,
2005.

[BRS] Bohli, J., Roehrich, S., and R. Steinwandt, "Key
Substitution Attacks Revisited: Taking into Account
Malicious Signers", International Journal of Information
Security Volume 5, Issue 1, January 2006.

[BSS] Blake, I., Seroussi, G., and N. Smart, "Elliptic Curves in
Cryptography", Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[EBP] ECC Brainpool, "ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve
Generation", October 2005, <http://www.ecc-brainpool.org/
download/Domain-parameters.pdf>.

[ETSI] European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI),
"Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic
Signatures, Part 1: Hash Functions and Asymmetric
Algorithms", TS 102 176-1, July 2005.

[FIPS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-2, December 1998.

[G] Goubin, L., "A Refined Power-Analysis-Attack on Elliptic
Curve Cryptosystems", Proceedings of Public-Key-
Cryptography - PKC 2003, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
2567, Springer Verlag, 2003.

[CFDA] Cohen, H., Frey, G., Doche, C., Avanzi, R., Lange, T.,
Nguyen, K., and F. Vercauteren, "Handbook of Elliptic and
Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography", Chapman & Hall CRC
Press, 2006.

[HMV] Hankerson, D., Menezes, A., and S. Vanstone, "Guide to
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Springer Verlag, 2004.

[HR] Huang, M. and W. Raskind, "Signature Calculus and the
Discrete Logarithm Problem for Elliptic Curves
(Preliminary Version)", Unpublished Preprint, 2006,
http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~mdhuang/mypapers/062806dl3.pdf.

[ISO1] International Organization for Standardization,
"Information Technology - Security Techniques - Digital
Signatures with Appendix - Part 3: Discrete Logarithm
Based Mechanisms", ISO/IEC 14888-3, 2006.

[ISO2] International Organization for Standardization,
"Information Technology - Security Techniques -
Cryptographic Techniques Based on Elliptic Curves - Part
2: Digital signatures", ISO/IEC 15946-2, 2002.

[ISO3] International Organization for Standardization,
"Information Technology - Security Techniques - Prime
Number Generation", ISO/IEC 18032, 2005.

[JMV] Jao, D., Miller, SD., and R. Venkatesan, "Ramanujan Graphs
and the Random Reducibility of Discrete Log on Isogenous
Elliptic Curves", IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2004/312,
2004.

[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.

[RFC4050] Blake-Wilson, S., Karlinger, G., Kobayashi, T., and Y.
Wang, "Using the Elliptic Curve Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA) for XML Digital Signatures", RFC 4050, April 2005.

[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.

[RFC4754] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
RFC 4754, January 2007.

[RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, January 2010.

[SA] Satoh, T. and K. Araki, "Fermat Quotients and the
Polynomial Time Discrete Log Algorithm for Anomalous
Elliptic Curves", Commentarii Mathematici Universitatis
Sancti Pauli 47, 1998.

[SEC1] Certicom Research, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography",
Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) 1, September
2000.

[SEC2] Certicom Research, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain
Parameters", Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) 2,
September 2000.

[Sem] Semaev, I., "Evaluation of Discrete Logarithms on Some
Elliptic Curves", Mathematics of Computation 67, 1998.

[Sma] Smart, N., "The Discrete Logarithm Problem on Elliptic
Curves of Trace One", Journal of Cryptology 12, 1999.

[20] IETF RFC 6637 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in OpenPGP, 2012

関連文書(Related document)

AUTOSAR Abstract Platformへの道 R22-11

自動車　記事　１００

Basic principles, ボッシュ自動車handbook(英語)11版まとめ<2>

JAXA/IPA クリティカルソフトウェアワークショップ WOCS言語関連発表(改定版)

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「はじめてのCAN/CANFD 」ベクタージャパン＜エンジニア夏休み企画>【読書感想文】

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詳解車載ネットワーク CAN, CAN FD, LIN, CXPI, Ethernetの仕組みと設計のために(1) 著者　＜エンジニア夏休み企画読書感想文＞

詳解車載ネットワーク CAN, CAN FD, LIN, CXPI, Ethernetの仕組みと設計のために(2)参考文献＜エンジニア夏休み企画>【読書感想文】

詳解車載ネットワーク CAN、CAN FD、LIN、CXPI、Ethernetの仕組みと設計のために

＜この記事は個人の過去の経験に基づく個人の感想です。現在所属する組織、業務とは関係がありません。＞

文書履歴(document history)

ver. 0.01初稿　　20230618

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