AUTOSARは自動車用OSの業界団体規格です。　
業務で利用する場合には、会員になることを条件にしています。

2002年から20年経ち、当初の狙いの段階に近づいてきました。

MATLABでモデルさえ記述すれば、あとは自動生成だけでソフトが完成するところまで、あと一歩です。
Ethernet, UNIXが生まれて20年で大衆化したのと同じように考えると分かりやすいでしょう。　

AUTOSARの上で動く、クラウド対応のミドルウェアが出て、開発も運用もクラウドになれば、一気にAUTOSARは大衆化するでしょう。

AUTOSAR Abstract Platformへの道 R22-11

2023年4月URL変更

この項は2023年4月21日、AUTOSARの文書のURLが変更になった。
/classic/22-11/
が
/R22-11/CP/
過去記事で、URLでエラーが出たら書き換えてみてください。

/adaptive/22-11/
は　
/R22-11/AP/

/foundation/22-11/
は　
/R22-11/FO/
です。

2023年11月URL変更

2023年11月にもAUTOSAR文書のURLが変更になっている。
/user_upload/standards/classic/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/CP/
などに書き換えてください。

/user_upload/standards/adaptive/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/AP/

/user_upload/standards/foundation/21-11/
を
/standards/R21-11/FO/

お手数をおかけします。
１年に２度URLを変更するなんて、新しい記事が書ける。とても嬉しい。

一覧

AUTOSAR R22-11 Qiita記事一覧 20230421 。

この記事の表題の最後に「20230421」を加えます。

<この項は書きかけです。順次追記します。>

AUTOSARが、2022年の版、R22-11を公開しました。

R21-11
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R21-11/CP/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf

R20-11
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R20-11/CP/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf

R19-11
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R19-11/CP/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf

文書は検索してダウンロードできます。

R20-11,R21-11, R22-11の３年分だけになりました。

公開行事の模様は

AUTOSAR R22-11 Release Event 20221208

Classic Platform Release Overview, AUTOSAR No.0 ,R22-11, CP, 20230421

Foundation Release Overview, AUTOSAR, 781, R22-11, FO, 20230421

Adaptive Platform Release Overview, AUTOSAR 782, R22-11, AP, 20230421

要求仕様対応(Requirement and Specification)

Abstract Platformとの関係

RS統合。

<この項は書きかけです。順次追記します。>

文書変更(Document Change)

• Minor corrections / clarifications / editorial changes

用語(terms)

Term	Description
CSM	The AUTOSAR Crypto Service Manager
SecOC	Secure Onboard Communication
MAC	Message Authentication Code
FV	Freshness Value
FM	Freshness Manager
Authentic I-PDU	An Authentic I-PDU is an arbitrary AUTOSAR I-PDU the content of which is secured during network transmission by means of the Secured I-PDU. The secured content comprises the complete I-PDU or a part of the IPDU.
Authentication	Authentication is a service related to identification. This function applies to both entities and information itself. Two parties entering into a communication should identify each other. Information delivered over a channel should be authenticated as to origin, date of origin, data content, time sent, etc. For these reasons, this aspect of cryptography is usually subdivided into two major classes: entity authentication and data origin authentication. Data origin authentication implicitly provides data integrity (for if a message is modified, the source has changed).
Authentication Information	The Authentication Information consists of a Freshness Value (or a part thereof) and an Authenticator (or a part thereof). Authentication Information are the additional pieces of information that are added by SecOC to realize the Secured I-PDU
Authenticator	Authenticator is data that is used to provide message authentication. In general, the term Message Authentication Code (MAC) is used for symmetric approaches while the term Signature or Digital Signature refers to asymmetric approaches having different properties and constraints.
Data integrity	Data integrity is the property whereby data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since the time it was created, transmitted, or stored by an authorized source. To assure data integrity, one should have the ability to detect data manipulation by unauthorized parties. Data manipulation includes such things as insertion, deletion, and substitution.
Data origin authentication	Data origin authentication is a type of authentication whereby a party is corroborated as the (original) source of specified data created at some (typically unspecified) time in the past. By definition, data origin authentication includes data integrity.
Distinction unilateral/bilateral authentication	In unilateral authentication, one side proves identity. The requesting side is not even authenticated to the extent of proving that it is allowed to request authentication. In bilateral authentication, the requester is also authenticated at least (see below) to prove the privilege of requesting. There is an efficient and more secure way to authenticate both endpoints, based on the bilateral authentication described above. Along with the authentication (in the second message) requested initially by the receiver (in the first message), the sender also requests an authentication. The receiver sends a third message providing the authentication requested by the sender. This is only three messages (in contrast to four with two unilateral messages).
Entity authentication	Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured (through acquisition of corroborative evidence) of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the evidence is acquired). Note: Entity authentication means to prove presence and operational readiness of a communication endpoint. This is for example often done by proving access to a cryptographic key and knowledge of a secret.It is necessary to do this without disclosing either key or secret.Entity authentication can be used to prevent record-and-replay attacks. Freshness of messages only complicates them by the need to record a lifetime and corrupt either senders or receivers (real-time) clock.Entity authentication is triggered by the receiver, i.e. the one to be convinced, while the sender has to react by convincing. Record and replay attacks on entity authentication are usually prevented by allowing the receiver some control over the authentication process.In order to prevent the receiver from using this control for steering the sender to malicious purposes or from determining a key or a secret ("oracle attack"), the sender can add more randomness.If not only access to a key (implying membership to a privileged group) but also individuality is to be proven, the sender additionally adds and authenticates its unique identification.
Message authentication	Message authentication is a term used analogously with data origin authentication. It provides data origin authentication with respect to the original message source (and data integrity, but no uniqueness and timeliness guarantees).
Secured I-PDU	A Secured I-PDU is an AUTOSAR I-PDU that contains Payload of an Authentic I-PDU supplemented by additional Authentication Information.
Transaction authentication	Transaction authentication denotes message authentication augmented to additionally provide uniqueness and timeliness guarantees on data (thus preventing undetectable message replay).

英日単語帳

日本語は仮訳

T.B.D.

参考(reference)

Glossary も　参考に入れましょう。
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/standards/R22-11/FO/AUTOSAR_TR_Glossary.pdf

[1] AUTOSAR Layered Software Architecture
AUTOSAR_EXP_LayeredSoftwareArchitecture.pdf
[2] AUTOSAR General Requirements on Basic Software Modules
AUTOSAR_SRS_BSWGeneral.pdf
[3] AUTOSAR General Specification for Basic Software Modules
AUTOSAR_SWS_BSWGeneral.pdf
[4] Specification of Communication
AUTOSAR_SWS_COM - Specification of Communication
[5] AUTOSAR SecOC Software Requirements Specification
AUTOSAR_SRS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf
[6] Specification of I-PDU Multiplexer
AUTOSAR_SWS_I-PDUMultiplexer.pdf
[7] Specification of PDU Router
AUTOSAR_SWS_PduRouter.pdf
[8] Specification of Crypt Service Manager
AUTOSAR_SWS_CryptoServiceManager.pdf
[9] System Template, https://svn3.autosar.org/repos2/work/24_Sources/branches/R4.0/TPS_SystemTemplate_063/AUTOSAR_TPS_SystemTemplate.pdf
[10] Software Component Template,
https://svn3.autosar.org/repos2/work/24_Sources/branches/R4.0/TPS_SoftwareComponentTemplate_062/AUTOSAR_TPS_SoftwareComponentTemplate.pdf
[11] Koscher et al: Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile, 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
[12] Checkoway et al: Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces, USENIX Security 2011
[13] Auguste Kerckhoffs, ‘La cryptographie militaire’, Journal des sciences militaires, vol. IX, pp. 5–38, Jan. 1883, pp. 161–191, Feb. 1883.
[14] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996.
[15] Danny Dolev and Andrew C. Yao: On the security of public key protocols, In Foundations of Computer Science, SFCS 1981
[16] M. Dworkin: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, U.S. Department of Commerce, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, USA, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, 2005
[17] IEC 7498-1 The Basic Model, IEC Norm, 1994
誤植：see AUTOSAR References to ISO, IEC, ITU, IEEE, RFC and SEA etc.
https://qiita.com/kaizen_nagoya/items/d7d252211e10a79516df
[18] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): FIPS-180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012, available electronically at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf
[19] FIPS Pub 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), U.S. Department of Commerce, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, USA, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, 2001, electronically available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf

R23-11

＜この記事は個人の過去の経験に基づく個人の感想です。現在所属する組織、業務とは関係がありません。＞

文書履歴(document history)

ver. 0.01初稿　　20230702

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Specification of Secure Onboard Communication, AUTOSAR 654, R22-11, CP, 20230421