Specification of Secure Onboard Communication, No.654, 2021-11
AUTOSAR R21-11記事一覧はこちら。
AUTOSAR 21-11, 160文書読んだ。2022年5月に半分到達。
AUTOSAR R21-11(0) 仕様ダウンロード一覧。単語帳。参考文献資料作成
用語(terms)
| Term | Description |
|---|---|
| CSM | The AUTOSAR Crypto Service Manager |
| SecOC | Secure Onboard Communication |
| MAC | Message Authentication Code |
| FV | Freshness Value |
| FM | Freshness Manager |
| Authentic I-PDU | An Authentic I-PDU is an arbitrary AUTOSAR I-PDU the content of which is secured during network transmission by means of the Secured I-PDU. The secured content comprises the complete I-PDU or a part of the IPDU. |
| Authentication | Authentication is a service related to identification. This function applies to both entities and information itself. Two parties entering into a communication should identify each other. Information delivered over a channel should be authenticated as to origin, date of origin, data content, time sent, etc. For these reasons, this aspect of cryptography is usually subdivided into two major classes: entity authentication and data origin authentication. Data origin authentication implicitly provides data integrity (for if a message is modified, the source has changed). |
| Authentication Information | The Authentication Information consists of a Freshness Value (or a part thereof) and an Authenticator (or a part thereof). Authentication Information are the additional pieces of information that are added by SecOC to realize the Secured I-PDU |
| Authenticator | Authenticator is data that is used to provide message authentication. In general, the term Message Authentication Code (MAC) is used for symmetric approaches while the term Signature or Digital Signature refers to asymmetric approaches having different properties and constraints. |
| Data integrity | Data integrity is the property whereby data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since the time it was created, transmitted, or stored by an authorized source. To assure data integrity, one should have the ability to detect data manipulation by unauthorized parties. Data manipulation includes such things as insertion, deletion, and substitution. |
| Data origin authentication | Data origin authentication is a type of authentication whereby a party is corroborated as the (original) source of specified data created at some (typically unspecified) time in the past. By definition, data origin authentication includes data integrity. |
| Distinction unilateral/bilateral authentication | In unilateral authentication, one side proves identity. The requesting side is not even authenticated to the extent of proving that it is allowed to request authentication. In bilateral authentication, the requester is also authenticated at least (see below) to prove the privilege of requesting. There is an efficient and more secure way to authenticate both endpoints, based on the bilateral authentication described above. Along with the authentication (in the second message) requested initially by the receiver (in the first message), the sender also requests an authentication. The receiver sends a third message providing the authentication requested by the sender. This is only three messages (in contrast to four with two unilateral messages). |
| Entity authentication | Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured (through acquisition of corroborative evidence) of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the evidence is acquired). Note: Entity authentication means to prove presence and operational readiness of a communication endpoint. This is for example often done by proving access to a cryptographic key and knowledge of a secret.It is necessary to do this without disclosing either key or secret.Entity authentication can be used to prevent record-and-replay attacks. Freshness of messages only complicates them by the need to record a lifetime and corrupt either senders or receivers (real-time) clock.Entity authentication is triggered by the receiver, i.e. the one to be convinced, while the sender has to react by convincing. Record and replay attacks on entity authentication are usually prevented by allowing the receiver some control over the authentication process.In order to prevent the receiver from using this control for steering the sender to malicious purposes or from determining a key or a secret ("oracle attack"), the sender can add more randomness.If not only access to a key (implying membership to a privileged group) but also individuality is to be proven, the sender additionally adds and authenticates its unique identification. |
| Message authentication | Message authentication is a term used analogously with data origin authentication. It provides data origin authentication with respect to the original message source (and data integrity, but no uniqueness and timeliness guarantees). |
| Secured I-PDU | A Secured I-PDU is an AUTOSAR I-PDU that contains Payload of an Authentic I-PDU supplemented by additional Authentication Information. |
| Transaction authentication | Transaction authentication denotes message authentication augmented to additionally provide uniqueness and timeliness guarantees on data (thus preventing undetectable message replay). |
英日単語帳
日本語は仮訳
T.B.D.
参考(reference)
[1] AUTOSAR Layered Software Architecture
AUTOSAR_EXP_LayeredSoftwareArchitecture.pdf
[2] AUTOSAR General Requirements on Basic Software Modules
AUTOSAR_SRS_BSWGeneral.pdf
[3] AUTOSAR General Specification for Basic Software Modules
AUTOSAR_SWS_BSWGeneral.pdf
[4] Specification of Communication
AUTOSAR_SWS_COM - Specification of Communication
[5] AUTOSAR SecOC Software Requirements Specification
AUTOSAR_SRS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf
[6] Specification of I-PDU Multiplexer
AUTOSAR_SWS_I-PDUMultiplexer.pdf
[7] Specification of PDU Router
AUTOSAR_SWS_PduRouter.pdf
[8] Specification of Crypt Service Manager
AUTOSAR_SWS_CryptoServiceManager.pdf
[9] System Template, https://svn3.autosar.org/repos2/work/24_Sources/branches/R4.0/TPS_SystemTemplate_063/AUTOSAR_TPS_SystemTemplate.pdf
[10] Software Component Template,
https://svn3.autosar.org/repos2/work/24_Sources/branches/R4.0/TPS_SoftwareComponentTemplate_062/AUTOSAR_TPS_SoftwareComponentTemplate.pdf
[11] Koscher et al: Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile, 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
[12] Checkoway et al: Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces, USENIX Security 2011
[13] Auguste Kerckhoffs, ‘La cryptographie militaire’, Journal des sciences militaires, vol. IX, pp. 5–38, Jan. 1883, pp. 161–191, Feb. 1883.
[14] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996.
[15] Danny Dolev and Andrew C. Yao: On the security of public key protocols, In Foundations of Computer Science, SFCS 1981
[16] M. Dworkin: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, U.S. Department of Commerce, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, USA, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, 2005
[17] IEC 7498-1 The Basic Model, IEC Norm, 1994
[18] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): FIPS-180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012, available electronically at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf
[19] FIPS Pub 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), U.S. Department of Commerce, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, USA, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, 2001, electronically available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
Glossary も 参考に入れましょう。